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Abstract
1This paper presents the application of the current federal regulatory system gov-
erning clinical research in the United States to research involving terminally ill subjects,
with a special emphasis on those patients battling terminal cancer. To begin, I describe
the current regulatory system governing the approval process for new drugs, the guidelines
established by the federal regulations for the conduct of clinical research involving human
subjects, and the federal initiatives that have been developed to increase and expedite ac-
cess to experimental therapies for terminally ill patients. In addition to tracing the roots
of the informed consent paradigm in research with human subjects, I also consider the suf-
ﬁciency and eﬃcacy of this model as applied to clinical research involving the terminally
ill. Addressing in particular the continuing war against cancer, I present some of the most
notorious controversies and case law that have emerged in the last century with respect to
new experimental cancer therapies, as well as the role of Congress in the ongoing debate
concerning access to investigational treatments by terminal patients. Finally, I consider
the speciﬁc vulnerabilities and experiences of desperately ill individuals ﬁghting to survive,
characteristics that make them particularly susceptible to coercion and exploitation, and,
therefore, potentially in need of additional safeguards to adequately protect them in the
research endeavor.
2I. Introduction
During a congressional hearing held last year addressing the current state of cancer prevention and research
in the United States, Tommy Thompson, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, oﬀered
sobering statistics from the war against cancer: in 2002, 1.2 million new cases of cancer were expected in the
United States, and approximately 550,000 Americans are expected to die of cancer annually, translating into
roughly 1,500 deaths per day, and a quarter of all deaths annually, caused by various forms of the destructive
disease.1 In addition, Senator Tom Harkin aptly noted in his opening statement, “[a]ll of us in this room
today have had our lives touched by this killer,” revealing that he had lost his only two sisters and two of
his three brothers to cancer.2
Dismal as the numbers are, the hearing did not focus on the devastating statistics with which we are all
undoubtedly aware, but rather was devoted to addressing the eﬀectiveness and progress of the adminis-
tration’s “three-pronged oﬀensive – research, treatment and prevention.”3 Of particular relevance to this
paper, several witnesses at the hearing stressed the importance of clinical trials in cancer research. Secretary
Thompson, for example, posed the crucial question of how to get new and promising cancer drugs to the
market as quickly as possible, and noted a positive trend toward increased access to such therapies, stating
that one-half of the cancer drugs in the last three years have made it to the market within six months.4
While eﬀective clinical research has signiﬁcantly contributed to the advances made thus far in the ﬁght
1See Cancer Prevention and Research: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education
of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong. (June 4, 2002) (statement of Sec. Tommy Thompson, Department of
Health and Human Services).
2See id. (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin, Chairman, Senate Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Education).
3Id.
4See id. (statement of Tommy Thompson).
3against cancer, and will unquestionably continue to do so in the future, several aspects of the current clinical
research mechanisms in place have prompted interested parties to enlist in the war against cancer, as well
as other life-threatening diseases, and to voice their concerns on a number of issues, including claims that
there are insuﬃcient resources to make clinical trials function as eﬀectively as possible and complaints that
investigators are overly burdened with complex regulatory procedures. In addition, and more germane to
this paper, there is a concern that strikes at the heart of the ethics of clinical trial research: the protection
of human subjects. As one witness testifying at the above hearing asserted, while clinical trials involving
patients with cancer are “the requisite path for our advances” in cancer research, “unfortunately, there are
infrequent – but, in some cases, serious – lapses in protection of human subjects.”5
In the pages that follow I will focus on one group of human subjects in particular, a group of individuals for
whom conventional therapies are either unavailable or ineﬀective and for whom experimental therapies and
drugs may oﬀer their only hope of survival. Perhaps more so than any other class of research subjects, the
plight of terminally ill patients exempliﬁes the balancing act engaged in by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA), which has struggled at times to emphasize the value of promoting access to experimental and
unapproved treatments, while at the same time, recognizing the importance and value of protecting vulner-
able research subjects.6 Speciﬁcally, this paper presents the application of the current regulatory framework
for clinical research to trials and research involving terminally ill subjects, with a special emphasis on those
patients battling terminal cancer. Questions posed and considered include whether the informed consent
model adequately protects terminally ill subjects who choose to participate in research; whether the vulner-
abilities of this class of subjects warrants their inclusion in the federal regulations that explicitly provide
additional safeguards to certain “vulnerable” populations, such as pregnant women, children, and prisoners;
5Id. (statement of Dr. Ronald Herberman, Director, University of Pittsburgh Cancer Institute).
6See Baruch A. Brody, Research on the Vulnerable Sick, in Beyond Consent 45 (Jeﬀrey P. Kahn et al. eds., Oxford University
Press, 1998).
4and whether the FDA and related regulatory powers have struck an appropriate balance between providing
expanded and expedited access to potentially life-saving, albeit experimental, therapies and suﬃciently pro-
tecting those subjects who may be willing to try anything in the hope that they will win the war that has
likely already ravaged them both physically as well as psychologically.
With those issues in mind, this paper ﬁrst sets out the federal regulatory system governing the approval
process for new drugs in the United States, the guidelines established by the federal regulations for the
conduct of research involving human subjects, and the federal initiatives that have been developed in order
to increase and expedite access to experimental therapies for terminally ill patients. In addition, it traces
the roots of the informed consent paradigm that has become central to clinical research with human sub-
jects, and considers the eﬃcacy and suﬃciency of this model as applied to clinical research involving the
terminally ill. Delving more speciﬁcally into the war on cancer, this paper brieﬂy describes some of the most
notorious controversies and case law that have emerged in the last century concerning new experimental
cancer therapies and the experiences of desperate patients ﬁghting to gain access to them. Likewise, the role
of Congress and the eﬀorts of concerned members to increase access to investigational treatments, as well as
attempts by other interested parties to ensure the safety and protection of research subjects, will be high-
lighted. Finally, this paper will consider the speciﬁc vulnerabilities of individuals battling terminal illnesses,
characteristics that make them particularly susceptible to coercion, undue inﬂuence and exploitation in the
research endeavor. After considering such issues, the reader is encouraged to draw his or her own conclusion
concerning the appropriate balance to be struck between expanding access to experimental therapies for the
terminally ill and providing adequate safeguards to guarantee the protection of desperately ill subjects who
may view investigational and unapproved treatments as their last chance for survival.
II. An Overview of the Drug Approval Process
5In order to get governmental approval for new drugs, applicants must meet the safety and eﬀectiveness
standards established under the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA), which requires
“substantial evidence” of safety and eﬃcacy prior to approval.7 Spurred by a national scandal in which
nearly one hundred people died after ingesting a drug marketed as “Elixir Sulfanilamide,” the liquid base of
which was poisonous, the FDCA imposed a new and strengthened drug approval process requiring, among
other things, drug sponsors to provide evidence of safety before marketing a drug.8 However, it did not
require evidence that the drug was in fact beneﬁcial for its intended uses.9 It was not until another drug-
related tragedy in the early 1960s that FDA control over the approval and distribution of new drugs was
tightened. The thalidomide tragedy and the tremendous public reaction to its horriﬁc side-eﬀects, including
severely deformed and disabled babies, prompted Congress to amend the FDCA in 1962 to provide a more
aggressive system of pre-market review and mandatory approval before bringing new drugs into the market.10
In addition to adding the safety and eﬀectiveness “substantial evidence” standard, the amendments granted
the FDA discretionary power over determining necessary clinical testing of proposed drugs and allowed the
FDA to revoke authorization for clinical trials if there was any evidence that the drug was unsafe.11
A. Investigational New Drugs (INDs) and Preclinical Hurdles
721 U.S.C. § 355(d); see Michael E. Horwin, “War on Cancer”: Why Does the FDA Deny Access to Alternative Cancer
Treatments?, 38 Cal. W.L. Rev. 189, 197 (2001).
8See Richard J. Nelson, Note & Comment, Regulation of Investigational New Drugs: “Giant Step for the Sick and Dying”?,
77 Geo. L.J. 463, 469 (1988).
9See id.
10See id.; see also FDA Proposals to Ease Restrictions on the Use and Sale of Experimental Drugs, 1987: Hearing Before a
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1987) (testimony of Richard Cooper, former
Chief Counsel of FDA) (asserting that the thalidomide disaster was the “actual triggering point” for the 1962 amendments);
Views of Senators Kefauver, Carroll, Dodd, Hart, and Long, 1962 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2898, 2905-07 (citing
history of thalidomide as reason for strengthening drug approval process, and noting that “[u]nder [the present system] it is the
American people who unknowingly serve as guinea pigs for experiments by the drug companies”); 108 Cong. Rec. 17,378 (1962)
(statement of Sen. Hruska) (citing history of thalidomide “to illustrate the necessity of additional provisions in the law”).
11Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codiﬁed in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-81);
see 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 355.
6The preclinical hurdles that must be passed in order to gain FDA approval begin with an initial phase of
preclinical investigations and animal studies to determine whether the drug is reasonably safe for clinical
trials and has potential for treating a speciﬁc disease.12 If such a determination is made, the drug’s sponsor
or manufacturer may submit an application for an investigational new drug (IND) exemption in order to
facilitate further drug research and development.13 Included in the IND application must be such items as a
description of both the drug composition and manufacturing and quality controls methods, all information
derived from preclinical testing, statements about the drug’s history, an outline of the proposed phases
of further testing, a statement identifying an institutional review board with reviewing authority over the
investigation, and an agreement by the applicant to report any signiﬁcant hazards and side eﬀects.14 At
this stage in the approval process, and thirty days after the FDA receives the IND application,15 the drug’s
sponsor may begin the three required phases of human trials, which must satisfy certain human subject
protections and be approved by an Investigational Review Board (“IRB”), which is appointed to oversee the
trials and ensure that they are ethical and the rights of study participants are protected.
B. The Role of IRBs in Clinical Research
Peer review by IRBs characterizes clinical research with human subjects in the United States. An IRB is
an independent committee of physicians, statisticians, community advocates, and others that must initially
approve and periodically review every clinical trial in the U.S. to ensure that the risks are as low as possible
12See John Patrick Dillman, Note, Prescription Drug Approval and Terminal Diseases: Desperate Times Require Desperate
Measures, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 925, 928 (1991).
13FDCA § 505(i); see 21 C.F.R. § 312.40 (2003); see also Patricia C. Kuszler, Financing Clinical Research and Experimental
Therapies: Payment Due, But From Whom?, 3 DePaul J. Health Care L. 441, 447 (2000); see also Horwin, supra note 7, at
199.
14See Dillman, supra note 12, at 928.
15See 21 C.F.R. § 312.40(c).
7and are justiﬁed by the potential beneﬁts of the research.16 Consisting of at least ﬁve individuals with varying
backgrounds and diverse training, IRB membership is intended to promote objectivity in the review process
and to counter any institutional or professional bias that might interfere with the IRB’s critical objective of
protecting research subjects.17 Moreover, membership requirements are designed to ensure the professional
competence and expertise of an IRB as well as to foster “sensitivity to such issues as community attitudes”
and respect for certain “vulnerable categor[ies] of subjects.”18 Its primary role is to make sure that each
research institution is ethically and scientiﬁcally sound, as well as to ensure that the human subjects are
selected in an equitable manner and have given their informed, voluntary consent before participating in any
studies.19 In order to protect the rights and welfare of human research subjects, IRBs review the informed
consent documents and procedures involved in research projects and require research investigators to address
several ethical issues before submitting their protocols for review.20 This early pressure imposed by IRBs
has led many investigators and IRB members to agree that the main eﬀect of an IRB is felt before they even
review a protocol.21
In evaluating a research protocol, IRB members consider several features outlined in the federal regulations
under which IRBs operate.22 These regulations require, for example, that the risks to subjects are minimized
and are reasonable in relation to the anticipated beneﬁts and the importance of the knowledge to be gained by
the research.23 Additionally, an IRB must ﬁnd that the selection of subjects is equitable; that material facts
will be disclosed; that research investigators and sponsors have obtained and documented informed consent
16See ClinicalTrials.gov: An Introduction to Clinical Trials, A Service of the National Institutes of Health, at
http://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ct/gui/info (last visited Mar. 31, 2003).
17See 21 C.F.R. § 56.107(a).
18Id.
19See 21 C.F.R. § 56.111 (2003); see also D. Christian Addicott, Regulating Research on the Terminally Ill: A Proposal for
Heightened Safeguards, 15 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 479, 482 (1999).
20See Charles R. McCarthy, The Institutional Review Board: Its Origins, Purpose, Function, and Future, in
Research on Human Subjects: Ethics, Law and Social Policy 316 (David N. Weisstub ed., 1998).
21See id.
2221 C.F.R. § 56.111; see Dale L. Moore, An IRB Member’s Perspective on Access to Innovative Therapy, 57 Alb. L. Rev.
559, 562 (1994).
2321 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(1)-(2).
8from each prospective subject or authorized representative; and that additional safeguards are established for
“vulnerable” subjects.24 After completing its evaluation, an IRB may approve a research protocol, approve
a protocol contingent on certain modiﬁcations, or disapprove and reject a protocol. Perhaps it is because of
their broad authority and responsibility for scrutinizing all research protocols that IRBs are considered by
some to be the “backbone of the federal regulatory system.”25
C. The Phases of Clinical Trial Research
Clinical trials on human subjects generally include three phases. Phase I trials, which typically include a
small group of healthy human subjects, focus on determining the safety, relative toxicity, and side eﬀects of
a drug at various doses.26 In addition to its primary goal of determining a drug’s safety proﬁle, investigators
in Phase I trials also work to determine how, and at what rate, the drug is absorbed, metabolized, and elim-
inated from the body.27 In Phase II testing, investigators ﬁrst administer the drug to symptomatic patients
who actually suﬀer from the condition or disease being targeted by the drug.28 At this stage investigators
evaluate the drug’s safety in a larger population than Phase I and attempt to establish the optimal dosage, as
well as statistical end points that represent the targeted favorable outcome of the study, and to preliminarily
assess the drug’s eﬃcacy.29
Phase III trials oﬀer the next opportunity for investigators to further reﬁne their research and again to gauge
the safety and eﬀectiveness of their drug. At this stage the investigators’ objective is to determine the eﬀec-
24Id. § 56.111(3)-(5).
25Addicott, supra note 19, at 482.
26See Dillman, supra note 12, at 928; see also ClinicalTrials.gov: An Introduction to Clinical Trials, supra note 16, at
http://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ct/gui/info.
27See Dillman, supra note 12, at 928-29.
28See id. at 929.
29See id.
9tiveness of the drug or treatment in the aﬀected population, based on the statistical end points established
in Phase II. By conducting at least two studies within a larger subject population, the investigators strive
to conﬁrm the drug’s eﬀectiveness, monitor side eﬀects and adverse reactions resulting from long-term use,
compare the study drug to more common treatments, and collect and record information that will facilitate
the safe use of the drug or treatment by patients.30
Although the FDA’s assessment of safety and eﬀectiveness, as well as its determination whether to approve or
reject a drug’s entry into the market, occurs after Phase III, an additional phase resembling post-marketing
surveillance, rather than testing, is sometimes added.31 Phase IV includes the company’s ongoing evaluation
of the drug’s safety during routine use, and allows the FDA to similarly reevaluate its approval and, in
certain circumstances, to demand either a recall or relabeling of the drug.32 Additionally, if the drug is
being successfully administered for oﬀ-label indications, the company will often begin further clinical testing
for those uses in an eﬀort to expand the potential market for the drug.
Upon successful completion of Phase III trials, and where the data indicates that the drug is safe and eﬀec-
tive for its intended purpose, the drug’s sponsor may ﬁle a New Drug Application (NDA) with the FDA.33
Frequently spanning thousands of pages of accumulated data and analyses, the NDA supplies FDA reviewers
with information about test results, chemical compositions, proposed labeling, manufacturing methods, and
data surrounding safety and eﬀectiveness.34 If the application is deemed complete, the FDA must respond
within 180 days with an action letter that either (1) approves the application and grants permission to
market the drug, (2) determines that the application is basically approvable, but deﬁcient in some respect,
(3) rejects the application for cause, indicating the need for substantial amendment to the application, or
30See id.; see also ClinicalTrials.gov: An Introduction to Clinical Trials, supra note 16, at
http://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ct/gui/info.
31See Dillman, supra note 12, at 929.
32See id.
33See id. at 930.
34See id.
10(4) requests supplemental information from the drug’s sponsor.35
At this stage in the drug approval process, an applicant that has been rejected by the FDA can either
amend the application or request a notice of opportunity to be heard (NOOH). Depending on whether the
FDA considers the amendment to be a “major amendment,” the FDA has certain time limits within which
to review the revision and/or to issue a NOOH, and additionally exercises further discretionary power in
granting, postponing, or denying the hearing.36
III. Loosening the Regulations for Desperately Ill Patients
A. Compassionate Use INDs and Other Access Mechanisms
While federal regulations oﬀer a protective framework to ensure the safety and eﬀectiveness of drugs that
enter the market, critics of the regulatory regime have urged a relaxation of its more stringent requirements,
attacking, for instance, the long delays associated with compiling suﬃcient information to satisfy the “sub-
stantial evidence” standard for new drugs and the barriers it imposes to innovative drugs and therapies.37
Perhaps, in part, as a response to these calls for a less rigid regime, in 1977 the FDA introduced the “com-
passionate use IND” exemption to the regulation’s prohibition against the use of unapproved drugs to treat
severe forms of illness.38 Often conceived as the forerunner to the new “Treatment IND,” compassionate
use INDs represented one of the FDA’s informal attempts to respond to and satisfy the demands of the
35See id. at 930-31.
36Id. at 931.
37See Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval, and the FDA New Drug Screening Process, 3 N.Y.U.J.
Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 295, 315 (1999/2000) (noting that the “downside to the system is the substantial barrier that it imposes
to new and innovative forms of treatment”).
38See 4 [Drugs-Cosmetics] Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) P71,112 (Oct. 5, 1987); see also Nelson, supra note 8, at 471;
Greenberg, supra note 37, at 315-16.
11desperately ill to gain access to experimental treatments.39 In particular, such exemptions were granted
on a case-by-case basis pursuant to the request of the primary care physician of a critically ill patient to
prescribe an experimental drug not yet approved by the FDA patient in certain circumstances “even though
the primary purpose [was] not investigation but treatment.”40
Although compassionate use INDs oﬀered another potential avenue for severely ill patients to pursue, and
“were oriented to the end of treatment rather than the end of clinical research,”41 critics noted the inade-
quacies of such exemptions, pointing out that they were not formalized in the federal regulations and their
use was largely ad hoc and very poorly publicized.42 Speciﬁcally, critics argued that access to new drugs via
the compassionate use exemption became a function of individual doctors’ willingness and capacity to peti-
tion the FDA for its approval, a process typically involving signiﬁcant paperwork, delay, and bureaucracy.43
Moreover, such exemptions depended considerably on the willingness of drug companies to supply their
experimental new drugs, without charge, based on the prospect of future proﬁt from commercialization.44
Limited or uncertain incentives for these companies, in addition to the ad hoc and potentially very burden-
some FDA approval process for individual, patient-by-patient applications, as well as escalating pressure on
the FDA to adopt new reforms in the drug approval process in the face of the increasingly formidable AIDS
epidemic, prompted the FDA to adopt new regulations designed to increase access to, and accelerate the
approval process for, new and experimental drugs and therapies for seriously or terminally ill patients.45
Similar to the compassionate use procedure, another early informal access mechanism designed to make ex-
39See Lois K. Perrin, Note, The Catch-22 for Persons with AIDS: To Have or Not to Have Easy Access to Experimental
Therapies and Early Approval for New Drugs, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 105, 119 (1995).
40See 4 [Drugs-Cosmetics] Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) P71,112; see also Nelson, supra note 8, at 471.
41Greenberg, supra note 37, at 316.
42See Nelson, supra note 8, at 471.
43See Greenberg, supra note 37, at 316; see also Peter S. Arno & Karyn L. Feiden, Against the Odds: The Story of AIDS Drug
Development, Politics and Proﬁts 34-35 (1992) (noting that, reportedly, the informality of the compassionate use procedure
favored well-connected patients over those less fortunate).
44See Greenberg, supra note 37, at 316.
45See id.
12perimental treatments more accessible to desperate patients was the personal use import exemption, which
permitted individual patients to import limited quantities of unapproved drugs for their own personal medi-
cal use.46 As with the compassionate use procedure, the personal use exemption was never formally enacted
into federal regulation and suﬀered from its own set of criticisms.47 For example, the personal use exemption
provided fertile ground for the growth of buying clubs to facilitate the importation of experimental drugs
from Europe and South America, and posed potentially signiﬁcant and damaging risks to the eﬀectiveness
and success of American clinical trials, either by leading research subjects to secretly supplement their treat-
ment protocols, perhaps to avoid receiving a placebo, or by decreasing the number of voluntary research
participants.48 Likewise, it was criticized as an additional threat to eﬀective drug development due to the
potential ﬁnancial disincentives to domestic drug development, likely motivating patients to take advantage
of cheaper drugs made available for importation from overseas, even though such drugs may also have been
approved in the United States, albeit marketed at a higher price.49 Lastly, by allowing those patients “des-
perately in need of treatment” to opt out of the regulatory regime, the personal use exemption was criticized
as skewing consumer choice and leading to the commercial exploitation of such individuals, who would likely
lack the information required to evaluate the utility of many experimental therapies.50
B. Treatment INDs and Expanded Access Initiatives
46See id.; see also Eric Lindemann, Note, Importing AIDS Drugs: Food and Drug Administration Policy and its Limitations,
28 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. 133, 134 n.8 (1994).
47See Greenberg, supra note 37, at 316n.125; see also Lindemann, supra note 46, at 134n.8.
48See Greenberg, supra note 37, at 317; see also Arno & Feiden, supra note 43, at 60-70.
49See Greenberg, supra note 37, at 317; see also Lindemann, supra note 46, at 154-56.
50See Greenberg, supra note 37, at 317 (oﬀering as an example of this scenario the situation that occurred in the late 1980s
with a widely imported, unapproved anti-AIDS drug, dextran sulfate, that was later shown to be ineﬀective as treatment); see
also Arno & Feiden, supra note 43, at 71-82 (noting that one AIDS activist took the position that it was irrelevant whether
the drug worked, and that AIDS patients should be allowed import access regardless).
13In response to calls for more expansive and formalized reforms in the drug approval process, including
measures that would surpass the informal and frequently inconsistent eﬀorts already attempted, the FDA
instituted signiﬁcant reforms in the late 1980s, loosening its long-standing policy of requiring extensive
testing of new drugs.51 The ﬁrst such reform came in 1987, when the FDA changed its approach and
policy regarding investigational new drugs by enacting provisions that speciﬁcally authorized the “treatment
use” of such agents,52 allowing patients with “serious or immediately life-threatening” diseases53 to gain
access to some experimental drugs for medical treatment, rather than for the traditional purpose of research,
where “no comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or other therapy is available.”54 Accordingly, a
drug manufacturer may apply for permission to distribute a “Treatment IND” before ﬁnal approval by the
FDA, with the primary objective being “to facilitate the availability of promising new drugs to desperately
ill patients as early in the drug development as possible, before general marketing begins, and to obtain
additional data on the drug’s safety and eﬀectiveness.”55 One observer noted that such an eﬀort to expand
access to experimental therapies signaled a shift in the way the FDA, Congress, the pharmaceutical industry,
health professionals, and health activists view the role of drug development and regulation in the U.S., as
it highlighted the use of an investigational agent not primarily to gain information about its safety and
eﬀectiveness, as in controlled clinical studies, but to treat certain seriously ill patients.56
In order to promote the goal of speeding the “journey from laboratory to bedside of important new drugs
51See Nelson, supra note 8, at 463.
52The “treatment use” of a drug includes the use of a drug for diagnostic purposes. If a protocol for an investigational
drug meets the criteria of the applicable regulations, the protocol is to be submitted as a treatment protocol under the same
provisions. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(a) (2003).
53The regulations deﬁne an “immediately life-threatening disease” as “a stage of a disease in which there is a reasonable
likelihood that death will occur within a matter of months or in which premature death is likely without early treatment.” 21
C.F.R. § 312.34(b)(3)(ii) (2003). Although the regulations do not deﬁne “serious” disease, the preamble to the regulations oﬀer
several illustrations “normally [to] be considered serious diseases or stages of diseases,” including Alzheimer’s disease, advanced
multiple sclerosis, and advanced Parkinson’s disease. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,466, 19,467 (May 22, 1987) (codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R. § 312).
By contrast, diseases that are “normally [to] be considered to be immediately life-threatening” include advanced cases of AIDS,
advanced congestive heart failure, and most advanced metastatic refractory cancers. Id.
5421 C.F.R. § 312.34(a) (2003). See Nelson, supra note 8, at 463; see also Perrin, supra note 39, at 127.
5521 C.F.R. § 312.34(a); see Perrin, supra note 39, at 127.
56See Ken Flieger, FDA Finds New Ways to Speed Treatments to Patients, FDA Consumer Special Report (Jan. 1995), at
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/special/newdrug/speeding.html.
14for devastating illness,” while simultaneously safeguarding the public from unsafe or ineﬀective products and
ensuring the validity and integrity of controlled clinical trials, the Treatment IND regulations set forth certain
criteria to be met by any IND treatment or treatment protocol, including: (i) the drug is intended to treat a
serious or immediately life-threatening disease; (ii) there is no comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or
other therapy available to treat that stage of the disease in the intended patient population; (iii) the drug is
under investigation in a controlled clinical trial, under an IND in eﬀect for the trial, or all clinical trials have
been completed; and (iv) the sponsor of the controlled clinical trial is actively pursuing marketing approval
of the investigational drug with due diligence.57 Furthermore, treatment protocols and INDs are conditional
upon compliance with safeguards in place for the IND process, including the regulations governing informed
consent of human subjects, institutional review boards, distribution of the drug through qualiﬁed experts,
adequate production facilities, and submission of IND safety reports.58
For a drug intended to treat a “serious disease,” the FDA Commissioner may deny a request for Treatment
IND status if there is insuﬃcient evidence of the drug’s safety and eﬀectiveness to support such use.59 If
the Commissioner grants such request, however, a drug may be made available for treatment use during
of after Phase III clinical trials, or, in appropriate circumstances, as early as Phase II trials.60 For an
“immediately life-threatening disease,” the Commissioner may similarly deny a drug’s Treatment IND status
if the available evidence “fails to provide a reasonable basis for concluding that the drug: (A) May be eﬀective
for its intended use in its intended patient population; or (B) Would not expose the patients to whom the
drug is to be administered to an unreasonable and signiﬁcant additional risk of illness or injury.”61 However,
approval of Treatment IND status for drugs targeting such immediately terminal diseases may be available





15“earlier than Phase III, but ordinarily not earlier than Phase II.”62 By allowing early access to new and
innovative drugs and therapies, Treatment INDs oﬀer some relief from the long delays often associated with
the normal drug approval process, relief that is obviously welcomed by terminally ill patients with little hope
left of ﬁnding eﬀective alternative therapies.
C. Expedited Development and Accelerated Approval Reforms
In addition to Treatment INDs, expanding access to experimental drugs and therapies was a motivating force
behind the FDA’s expedited review provisions, which focus on accelerating or short-cutting the ordinary
clinical trial process in order to obtain full FDA approval in a shorter period of time.63 In August of
1988, Vice President George Bush, Chairman of the Presidential Task Force of Regulatory Relief, asked
the FDA to design procedures to speed the “marketing of new therapies intended to treat AIDS and other
life-threatening illness,” urging the FDA to more eﬃciently facilitate the approval process and to “transfer
...the fruits of biomedical research to the marketplace.”64 Quickly responding to the clear sense of urgency,
the FDA issued a “fast-track” regulation in October of 1988, which was to include procedures “designed to
speed the availability of new therapies to desperately ill patients, while preserving appropriate guarantees
for safety and eﬀectiveness.”65
The expedited development regulations, known as “Subpart E” regulations, initially proposed in 1988, were
codiﬁed in 1992 in order to expedite the review of new drugs by introducing several reform measures and new
aspects of FDA review for the approval of new drugs and biologicals that treat “life-threatening and severely-
62Id. § 312.34(a).
63See Greenberg, supra note 37, at 321.
64See Perrin, supra note 39, at 129 (citations omitted).
6553 Fed. Reg. 41,516, 41,516 (Oct. 21, 1988); see Nelson, supra note 8, at 473.
16debilitating illnesses,” including: early consultation between the FDA and pharmaceutical developers; FDA
monitoring of the clinical trial process; abbreviation of clinical trials required in NDA submissions; and FDA
authority to require Phase IV post-marketing research as a condition for NDA approval.66
An additional step in reforming the traditional FDA review process came in 1993 when the FDA’s “acceler-
ated approval” regulations were codiﬁed and included as an essential element a provision adopting “surrogate
endpoints” to be used as standards for gauging treatment outcomes and the empirical basis for FDA approval
of a new drug.67 Rather than deﬁning positive outcome in terms of extended patient survival, as was typ-
ical in earlier clinical research practice, the accelerated approval procedure allows “surrogate endpoints” to
serve as predictive measures of clinical and therapeutic beneﬁt, despite the fact that they may not be direct
measures of how a patient feels, functions or survives.68 Moreover, the regulations suggest that surrogate
endpoints may be used in clinical trials even “where there is uncertainty as to the relation of the surrogate
endpoint to clinical beneﬁt, or of the observed clinical beneﬁt to ultimate outcome,” provided that additional
post-marketing studies are diligently carried out in order to verify the ultimate clinical beneﬁt of the new
drug.69 Bypassing more conservative empirical methods, such as strict reliance on “survival or irreversible
morbidity” data, and by permitting the use of surrogate endpoints, the FDA demonstrates its commitment
to making new drug products more widely and rapidly available to patients who otherwise have little hope
to gain access to alternative and innovative drugs and therapies.
66See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.80-321.88; see also Greenberg, supra note 37, at 321-22 (adding that, at a policy level, the Subpart
E regulations stressed the importance of ﬂexibility in the FDA’s application of the FDCA’s safety and eﬀectiveness standards,
especially in recognition f the increased risk-tolerance of seriously ill patients for whom no eﬀective treatment alternatives
existed).
67See 21 C.F.R. § 314.510; see also Greenberg, supra note 37, at 322 (asserting that the accelerated approval and Subpart
E regulations, together, “reﬂected a substantial shift in FDA policy to accommodate the reality of the AIDS epidemic and its
attendant political pressures”).
68See id.; see also Flieger, supra note 56, at 4; Greenberg, supra note 37, at 323 (using as an example research on AIDS
drugs where clinical trial outcome might be measured in terms of CD4 cell counts, an index of human immune function that
marks the physiological progression of AIDS).
6921 C.F.R. § 314.510.
17While expanded access to new drugs may oﬀer desperate patients some comfort when standard treatments
have been exhausted and proven futile, some have argued that eﬀorts such as the FDA’s policy for expedited
approval of new drugs lack speciﬁc prerequisites for follow-up studies and fail to enumerate FDA enforcement
power.70 Moreover, skeptics claim that the accelerated approval process exposes an even larger number of
people to uncertainty than expanded access protocols, and emphasize the inherent uncertainty in relying
upon surrogate endpoint data, as well as the possibility that the clinical beneﬁt may never even emerge.71
Although other federal initiatives have been introduced to streamline the drug approval process and make
new drugs more quickly available to certain desperate populations, such as terminal AIDS and cancer pa-
tients, the FDA procedures designed to expand access and accelerate approval have dominated its eﬀorts at
regulatory reform of drug development and the guidelines concerning research with human subjects.72
Despite the above reforms initiated during the late 1980s and early 1990s, concerned consumers, legislators
and drug manufacturers continued to criticize the rising costs and delays of FDA review.73 In particular,
critics stressed the ineﬃciencies in the coordination between the FDA and pharmaceutical manufacturers
in the design of clinical trial research, as well as the burdensome delays caused by “confusing [FDA] com-
munications” and “inadequate [FDA] guidance.”74 In response to these and other concerns, the Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA), signed into law in 1997, contained several provisions
70See Perrin, supra note 39, at 136.
71See id. at 136, 144.
72For example, the “parallel track” program, for example, was designed exclusively to target AIDS and HIV-related conditions,
and, although very similar to the treatment IND regulations, it took an additional step by providing that “expanding availability
protocols might be approved for promising investigational drugs when the evidence for eﬀectiveness is less than that generally
required for a treatment IND.” Expanded Availability of Investigational New Drugs Through a Parallel Track Mechanism for
People with AIDS and other HIV-Related Disease, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,250, 13,256 (1992); see Greenberg, supra note 37, at 324-25.
The parallel track initiative developed in part based on an earlier joint protocol sponsored by the FDA and National Cancer
Institute, referred to as “Group C” procedures, which permitted oncologists treatment access to experimental cancer drugs
outside of controlled clinical trials. See Expanded Availability, 57 Fed. Reg. at 13,256; see also Greenberg, supra note 37, at
325 (asserting that the parallel track policy purposely excluded diseases other than AIDS from its reach and was intended as a
pilot program to assess the incremental beneﬁts and risks of expanded access beyond that provided by other FDA initiatives).
73See Greenberg, supra note 37, at 343 (noting that by 1993, the average drug development time for FDA approval was
approximately 12 years, at an average cost of 350 million dollars per new drug).
74See id.; Drugs and Biologics: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on
Commerce, 104th Cong. 13-15 (1995) (statement of Christian W. Nolet, National Director, Life Sciences Industry Group).
18that addressed the new drug approval process. One commentator succinctly enumerated these elements of
the FDAMA,75 which included, among other provisions, the following: (1) Congress adopted into law a set
of expanded access provisions intended to supplement the FDA’s regulatory reforms and to stress the access
of experimental drugs to patients with serious and life-threatening diseases;76 (2) Congress amended the
FDCA to formalize the “fast track” status for expedited approval of new drugs, including corresponding
federal review procedures based on surrogate endpoint data, as well as allowed the FDA to begin its review
before the completion of an NDA;77 and (3) Congress set out for the FDA an explicit mission statement,
which holds the agency to protecting the public health through product regulation and to providing prompt
review of clinical trials and drug research.78 The balancing act in which the FDA seems to be constantly
engaged is reﬂected in these more recent eﬀorts to reform the new drug approval process, as the agency
attempts to eﬀectively maneuver itself and its resources between the two primary objectives of expanding
access to potentially life-saving drugs for the seriously and terminally ill and protecting those individuals
from the risks inherent in clinical trial research. At the core of the debate concerning early access to ex-
perimental therapies and clinical research for the terminally ill seems to be the issue of the meaningfulness
of the patients’ informed consent, particularly where information available to desperately ill subjects is less
than perfect and the potential risks are often not easily quantiﬁable. Because of the centrality of informed
consent to any discussion of clinical research involving human subjects, it is that topic to which I will now
turn.
IV. The Informed Consent Paradigm in Human Subject Research
75See Greenberg, supra note 37, at 344-45. Greenberg also noted other provisions in the FDAMA that bear on the drug
approval process, such as the renewal of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, which permits the FDA to collect user
fees from drug companies ﬁling new drug applications, as well as provisions calling for increased FDA accountability. See S.
Rep. No. 105-43, at 2, 4-5.
76See Pub. L. No. 105-115 561, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997); see also S. Rep. No. 105-43, at 76 (explaining the preconditions to
expanded access under statute).
77See Pub. L. No. 105-115 112, 111 Stat. 2296; see also S. Rep. No. 105-43, at 88.
78See Pub. L. No. 105-115 406, 111 Stat. 2296; see also S. Rep. No. 105-43, at 2.
19The National Institutes of Health (NIH) deﬁne “informed consent” as “the process of learning the key
facts about a clinical trial before deciding whether or not to participate,” as well as “a continuing process
throughout the study to provide information for participants.”79 In order to gain approval from an IRB
to conduct clinical trials, researchers must give subjects “suﬃcient opportunity to consider whether or
not to participate [and] minimize the possibility of coercion or undue inﬂuence.”80 As set forth explicitly
in the regulations, the “basic elements of informed consent” include such items as a statement that the
study involves research; a description of the purposes of the research and the procedures to be followed;
an explanation of any reasonably foreseeable risks and discomforts to the subject, as well as any expected
beneﬁts; and a disclosure of any alternative courses of treatment that might be beneﬁcial.81
While some evidence suggests that the informed consent framework was recognized in regulations for clinical
research and experimentation as early as the nineteenth century, in general the Nuremberg Code of 1947
(“Code”) is recognized as the ﬁrst document to set out ethical principles in human subject research based
on informed consent.82 Promulgated at the end of the 1946-47 trial of Nazi physician-experimenters, the
Nuremberg Code was created by U.S. judges in response to the horriﬁc non-therapeutic and nonconsensual
Nazi experiments involving the murder and torture of concentration camp prisoners.83 Although it was
79ClinicalTrials.gov: An Introduction to Clinical Trials, supra note 16, at http://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ct/gui/info.
8021 C.F.R. § 50.20.
81Id. § 50.25(a) (“Basic elements of informed consent”). In addition to the “basic elements of informed consent,” the
regulations set forth several additional elements of informed consent that are required in special circumstances. See id. §§
50.25(a)(5)-(8), 50.25(b)-(d), 50.27 (“Documentation of informed consent”).
82See Debra Johnson & Kathleen E. Squires, Women and Clinical Trials, at http://www.natap.org, at 3 (last visited Mar.
31, 2003; see also David N. Weisstub et al., Establishing the Boundaries of Ethically Permissible Research with Vulnerable Pop-
ulations, in Research on Human Subjects: Ethics, Law and Social Policy, supra note 20, at 355 (asserting that the Nuremberg
Code “initiated a process of inquiry on an international scale that has led to the evolution of various general ethical principles
intending to guide participants in the research endeavor”).
83See George J. Annas, Questing for Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal and Self-Deception in Postmodern Medical Research, 12 J.
Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 297, 301 (1996).
20formulated in reaction to such deplorable experiments, it was intended to be, and, indeed, has become, a
universal and authoritative legal and ethical document regulating human research standards internationally.84
Declaring that “[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential,” and setting out nine
other required elements in any research involving human subjects, the Code paved the way for today’s
informed consent guidelines and regulation of clinical research.85
Despite the promotion of the Code as an international ethical guide for researchers, its stringent and de-
manding standards led to the formulation of other codes of ethics and research, regulations, and laws that
provided a more balanced approach to research involving human subjects. One such creation, the Helsinki
Declaration of 1964 (“Declaration”), which seemed ostensibly to reaﬃrm the Code’s dedication to ensuring
that research with human subjects “conform[s] to the ethics of the medical profession generally” and that
“certain basic principles [are] observed in order to satisfy moral, ethical and legal concepts,”86 oﬀers more
ﬂexible guidelines and a broader framework within which physicians and researchers can ethically conduct
their trials.87 In addition to presenting “basic principles” applicable to all research involving human subjects,
the Declaration further divides research into therapeutic (“Medical Research Combined with Professional
Care,” or “Clinical Research”) and non-therapeutic (or “Non-Clinical Research”).88 As a result, Professor
84See id. (adding that it remains “one of the premier human rights documents in world history”).
85Nuremberg Code, excerpted from: “Permissible Medical Experiments,” Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg
Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10: Nuremberg (Oct. 1946-Apr.
1949), vol. 2, at 181-81 (setting out 10 principles to aid physicians and researchers in human subject research, including providing
proper preparations and adequate facilities to protect subjects against injury, disability or death, and permitting subjects to
terminate the experiment if desired), reprinted in Ethics of Research with Human Subjects: Selected Policies and Resources
12-13 (Jeremy Sugarman et al. eds., 1998).
86Introduction to the Nuremberg Code, Trial of War Criminal Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control
Council Law No. 10 (Oct. 1946-Apr. 1949).
87See Annas, supra note 83, at 303 (adding that the goal of the Declaration of Helsinki was “to replace the hu-
man rights-based agenda of the Nuremberg Code with a more lenient medical ethics model that permits paternal-
ism”); see also Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and the Ethics of Autonomy,
36 Cath. Law. 455, 472-73 (1996) (noting that the new approaches, such as the Helsinki Declaration, “strike a com-
promise between the Code’s idealism and the perceived need for more ﬂexible, permissive, and perhaps realistic guide-
lines for research”); Jay Katz, The Consent Principles of the Nuremberg Code: Its Signiﬁcance Then and Now, in
The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code: Human Rights in Human Experimentation 227, 238 (suggesting that modern re-
search regulations are less rigid and demanding than the Code).
88World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: Recommendations Guiding Physicians in Biomedical Research In-
21George Annas suggests that the line between treatment and research is blurred, and the distinction between
researcher and physician, as well as between subject and patient, is eﬀectively eliminated.89 Asserting that
“research becomes treatment, the researcher becomes the healer, and the subject becomes the patient,” An-
nas adds that in this way the current trend in clinical research goes further than the Declaration’s principles,
as “language is used to obscure the truth and justify the unjustiﬁable,” not only in the more primitive cold
war radiation experiments conducted in the U.S. in the 1940s through the 1960s, but in today’s clinical trials
and research performed on terminally ill cancer and AIDS patients as well.90
In an eﬀort to further broaden the reach and increase the ease of applicability of ethical principles to
guide research involving human subjects, in 1979 the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (“Commission”) published the Belmont Report, described
by the Commission as a statement of three “basic ethical principles” and guidelines that should provide
an analytical framework to guide the resolution of ethical problems arising from research involving human
subjects.91 Stating that the codes and rules developed in the latter half of the twentieth century “often
are inadequate to cover complex situations,” and “at times they come into conﬂict, and they are frequently
diﬃcult to interpret or apply,” the Belmont Report suggests that “[b]roader ethical principles will provide a
basis on which speciﬁc rules may be formulated, criticized and interpreted.”92 With that principle in mind,
volving Human Subjects, adopted by the 18th World Medical Assembly in Helsinki in 1964, as amended by the 29th
World Medical Assembly (1975), 35th World Medical Assembly (1983), 41st World Medical Assembly (1989), reprinted in
Ethics of Research with Human Subjects, supra note 85, at 14-18. Garnett noted that a major diﬀerence between the two
codes is the Declaration’s recognition and regulation of therapeutic research. While the Declaration recognized that the same
ethical principles should govern when conducting research with healthy volunteers as with those in need of care, the Code only
addressed non-therapeutic experimentation. See Garnett, supra note 87, at 473n.83 (citations omitted).
89See Annas, supra note 83, at 303.
90See id. at 304.
91The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, The Belmont
Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, 79 Fed. Reg. 12,065 (Apr. 18,
1979), reprinted in Ethics of Research with Human Subjects, supra note 85, at 19-30.
92Id. at 19.
22the Belmont Report sets out three “basic ethical principles” to form the basis for the protection of human
subjects: respect for persons, beneﬁcence, and justice.93 Moreover, it provides a set of requirements based
on those three comprehensive principles, focusing on (1) informed consent, (2) risk/beneﬁt assessment, and
(3) the selection of subjects of research.94 Likewise, the federal regulations governing research with human
subjects, known as the federal “Common Rule,” requires the establishment of IRBs to review and approve
research, and sets out the conditions of such approval, including extensive informed consent requirements, a
mandate that risks to subjects be minimized and reasonable in relation to expected beneﬁts, that subjects
be selected equitably, and that appropriate protections exist for special populations of subjects.95 Before
considering these regulations as they are applied, and perhaps should be applied, to one such “special
population,” namely, terminally ill cancer patients, it may be helpful to ﬁrst consider the unique experiences
and characteristics of the patients themselves and their battle against not only the disease, but at times the
regulatory powers that deny them access to experimental treatments which, at least in their minds, oﬀer one
last hope for a cure.
V. Cancer Research: Lessons from the Past and Implications for the Future
A. An Introduction to Cancer Research
Approaching clinical cancer research as a model for clinical trials overall, it has been argued that the “char-
93See id. at 20-24.
94See id. at 24-30; see also Nancy M. P. King et al., Relationships in Research: A New Paradigm, in
Beyond Regulations: Ethics in Human Subjects Research 8-10 (Nancy M. P. King et al. eds., 1999) (noting that the current
system of federal regulation of research with human subjects reﬂects, and is both grounded in and justiﬁed by, the “principlist
paradigm in the Belmont Report”).
95The Common Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 28012 (June 18, 1991); see King et al., supra note 94, at 10. Promulgated in 1991, the
Common Rule applies to all research involving human subjects conducted, supported or otherwise subject to regulation by any
federal department or agency. In addition, IRBs are required under the Common Rule by 16 federal departments and agencies,
as well as for research involving drugs, medical devices and biologics, regulated by the FDA. See McCarthy, supra note 20, at
316.
23acteristics that make clinical trials ethically important, and problematic, exist in cancer trials in exaggerated
form.”96 In particular, and from an ethical point of view, “cancer research has been the paradigm of trials
entailing not simply uncertainty but very serious risks on the part of subject participants.”97 Moreover, a
phenomenon well known in cancer research is equally applicable to all areas of clinical research: the miscon-
ception on the part of patients participating in a study that they will be receiving eﬀective treatments not
otherwise available.98
As an illustration, in the 1980s and 1990s, researchers searching for more eﬀective breast cancer treatments
began administering higher doses of chemotherapy followed by procedures to curb the severe adverse and toxic
side eﬀects by re-infusing harvested bone marrow to rescue the patient from the chemotherapy’s ravishing
eﬀects.99 Despite the treatment’s life-threatening side eﬀects, including bleeding disorders, infections, organ
dysfunction, severe nausea and gastrointestinal problems, to name just a few, desperate cancer patients
willing to try anything viewed it as their ﬁnal chance for a cure.100 Although there had been little research
showing the safety and eﬃcacy of the treatment, and despite the high mortality rate involved, many women,
approximately 12,000 to 30,000 in the United States, embraced it as their last chance for survival in a
devastating struggle in which no other therapies had proven eﬀective.101
Given the often lethal side eﬀects experienced by cancer patients who through their pain and suﬀering
“choose” to go still further in their search for a cure by participating in experimental drug trials, researchers
have begun to question what these increasingly invasive and severe approaches translate into for the quality
of life of the patients involved.102 As a result, quality of life research and evaluation have become an integral
96Benjamin Freedman, The Ethical Analysis of Clinical Trials: New Lessons for and from Cancer Research, in
The Ethics of Research Involving Human Subjects: Facing the 21st Century 320 (Harold Y. Vanderpool ed., 1996).
97Id. at 321.
98See id.
99See Kuszler, supra note 13, at 457.
100See id. at 458.
101See id. at 459.
102See Freedman, supra note 96, at 323.
24part of the eﬀorts to reﬁne the ethics of cancer clinical trials.103 Below is a brief overview of some of the
most widely publicized and inﬂuential “battles” in the war on cancer, including those that ended in the
courtroom, as well as in the halls of Congress, before arbiters positioned ultimately to decide the fate of
patients ravaged both physically and psychologically by the disease.
B. Cancer “Quackery”: The Laetrile Experience
Throughout the twentieth century desperately ill cancer patients have been promised a variety of “cures”
or eﬀective therapies for cancer by anxious researchers and often well-meaning physicians hoping to conquer
the deadly disease once and for all. Harry Hoxsey presented his cancer “cure” before World War II, but
was ultimately found guilty of fraud only after many patients had become victims of his scam.104 Another
unproven remedy, Krebiozen, gained popularity in the 1950s after being endorsed by a distinguished inves-
tigator, although ultimately it, too, had vanished by the beginning of the 1970s.105 Not to be outdone by
these more primitive therapies, Laetrile entered the scene with little noise in the 1960s and early 1970s, and
soon garnered much support and positive publicity as the new miracle “cure” for cancer.106
The Laetrile experience was perhaps the most notorious controversy involving the public policy questions
and concerns surrounding the access to experimental and highly unconventional treatments by desperately
103See id.
104See Stuart L. Nightingale, Second Binational Symposium: United States—Israel – Papers on the Role of Epidemiology and
Regulatory Programs, Public Health Rep. 1984; 99: 333-338 (1984).
105See id.; see also United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 558 (1979) (citing other examples of the “wide variety of
purportedly simple and painless cures for cancer, including liniments of turpentine, mustard, oil, eggs, and ammonia; peat
moss; arrangements of colored ﬂoodlamps; pastes made from glycerin and limburger cheese; mineral tablets; and “Fountain of
Youth” mixtures of spices, oil, and suet”).
106See Nightingale, supra note 104, at 334.
25ill patients.107 Touted by advocates to be an eﬀective therapy for cancer, the uncertainties surrounding the
“remedy” were profound. Besides agreement that Laetrile is obtained from apricot kernels, there was much
confusion over what the substance exactly was and how it should be promoted to the public.108 Similarly,
confusion also marked the actual proven value in treating patients, as supporters praised its eﬀectiveness
in curing, mitigating, and even preventing cancer, as an analgesic, as well as in treating such conditions as
sickle cell anemia, hypertension, and parasitic diseases.109 Despite their clamorous words of support, the
fact remained that there was no controlled trial data upon which to hang their cause, and FDA approval,
therefore, remained out of reach.110 The result was disheartening, as desperate patients were lured into the
hands of suspicious black-market practitioners, who successfully peddled the scientiﬁcally mysterious and
unapproved substance.111 At the same time, the FDA’s rejection of Laetrile did not stop several states from
passing pro-Laetrile legislation in the years prior to the release of clinical study results that ﬁnally put an
end to the lingering uncertainty of the drug’s eﬃcacy.112
In order to understand the promotional success of Laetrile, one need only consider the desperate position in
which cancer patients ﬁnd themselves, particularly in the terminal stages of the disease. The psychological
distress of these patients would certainly lead them to embrace therapies, no matter how unconventional,
that oﬀer some hope for a “cure,” or at least alleviation of some of their pain and suﬀering. In addition,
some claim that the popularized “success” of Laetrile was due in part to the messages relayed to the public
by its supporters, who claimed that organized medicine, colluding with the drug industry, the American
107See Greenberg, supra note 37, at 306-07.
108See Nightingale, supra note 104, at 334 (noting that supporters claimed that Laetrile is 1-mendelonitrile beta glucuronide,
conﬁscated samples revealed amygdalin, and it was additionally advertised as vitamin B-17, a drug, and a food).
109See id.
110See id.; see also Greenberg, supra note 37, at 307.
111See Dale H. Gieringer, Compassion Vs. Control: FDA Investigational-Drug Regulation, Cato Policy Analysis No. 72
(May 20, 1986), at 9-10 (suggesting that, “[g]iven that Laetrile was relatively non-toxic, especially in comparison with other
cancer treatments at the time, a rational medical case could have been made for its use, especially in conjunction with other
treatment, and it might at least have been beneﬁcial as a placebo”); but see Victor Herbert, Laetrile: The Cult of Cyanide
Promoting Poison for Proﬁt, American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 32 (May 1979), at 1121-58 (noting that a couple of
accidental poisonings from Laetrile overdoses were reported).
112In 1978, studies conducted by the National Cancer Institute ﬁnally began to conclusively dispel the lingering scientiﬁc
uncertainty over Laetrile’s eﬃcacy. See Geiringer, supra note 111, at 10.
26Cancer Society, and the government, was taking part in a conspiracy to prevent Laetrile from entering the
market.113 By participating in the campaign supporting Laetrile, cancer patients were ﬁghting not only to
gain access to the treatment, but were also taking part in an eﬀort to defy the establishment, a prospect that
was likely attractive to those patients with little trust in government regulations and critical of any motives
colored by paternalism.114
Psychological anxieties aside, many cancer patients and Laetrile advocates pushed to the forefront of the
debate “freedom of choice” arguments, asserting that Laetrile should be accessible to them regardless of
whether the FDA had approved it or the scientiﬁc community stood behind it.115 In other words, patients
and advocates argued that when no other therapies had proven eﬀective and nothing else was left to try,
they, as informed and consenting adults, should be free to use Laetrile without government interference. In
time, the “freedom of choice” line of argument developed into a more sophisticated claim for a comprehensive
“right of access” to experimental therapies such as Laetrile.116 One critical issue posed by such an expansive
right is whether FDA regulations, in accordance with the FDCA, should apply without modiﬁcation to the
terminally or seriously ill seeking to gain access to investigational or unapproved treatments.117 In 1979, the
United States Supreme Court ﬁrst spoke on this issue, and it is its unanimous opinion in United States v.
Rutherford to which I will now turn.
C. When Courts Intervene: Rutherford and Related Case Law
In Rutherford, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the government has the right to prevent
113See Nightingale, supra note 104, at 334.
114See id.
115See id.
116See Perrin, supra note 39, at 123.
117See id.
27terminally ill patients from choosing a drug treatment that is unapproved by the FDA.118 Terminally ill
cancer patients brought suit against the U.S. Government to enjoin the interference with the shipment and
sale of Laetrile.119 The Tenth Circuit had remanded the case to the FDA to determine whether Laetrile was
a “new drug” under § 201(p)(1) of the Act and, therefore, was subject to the “safety” and “eﬀectiveness”
standards of the FDCA. The FDA concluded that Laetrile was a “new drug” as deﬁned in § 201(p)(1) and fell
within neither of the FDCA’s grandfather provisions. After reviewing the FDA’s decision, the district court
found that Laetrile was exempt from premarketing approval under the Act’s 1962 grandfather clause, and,
alternatively, that the Commissioner of the FDA had infringed constitutionally protected privacy interests by
denying cancer patients access to Laetrile. Upholding the district court’s injunction, which allowed plaintiﬀs
to receive the drug, the Tenth Circuit asserted that “as a matter of law ...the ‘safety’ and ‘eﬀectiveness’
terms used in the statute have no reasonable application to terminally ill cancer patients.”120 In order to
address concerns that Laetrile was toxic when orally administered, the court limited relief to intravenous
injections for patients under a doctor’s supervision and directed the FDA to promulgate regulations “as if”
the drug had been found “safe” and “eﬀective” for terminally ill cancer patients.121
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the FDA had
the authority to require safety and eﬀectiveness for all drugs, including those intended to treat terminally
ill patients.122 The Court reasoned that “[n]othing in the history of the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, which ﬁrst established procedures for review of drug safety, or of the 1962 Amendments, which added
the current safety and eﬀectiveness standards in § 201(p)(1), suggests that Congress intended protection
118442 U.S. 544 (1979).
119Id. at 548.
120582 F.2d 1234, 1236 (1978).
121Id. at 1237.
122442 U.S. at 552.
28only for persons suﬀering from curable diseases.”123 In fact, the Court pointed to concerns expressed in
congressional deliberations surrounding the 1938 Act and 1962 Amendments that even “individuals with
fatal illnesses, such as cancer, should be shielded from fraudulent cures,” as well as to Committee Reports
noting the “FDA’s policy of considering eﬀectiveness when passing on the safety of drugs prescribed for
‘life-threatening disease.”’124
Deferring to the FDA’s determination not to allow the distribution of Laetrile, the Court cautioned that to
accept the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the FDCA’s safety and eﬃcacy standards have no relevance for
terminally ill patients “is to deny the Commissioner’s authority over all drugs, however toxic or ineﬀectual, for
such individuals.”125 Furthermore, the Court oﬀered a justiﬁcation for the uniform application of the FDCA’s
eﬃcacy standard, stating, “if an individual suﬀering from a potentially fatal disease rejects conventional
therapy in favor of a drug with no demonstrable curative properties, the consequences can be irreversible.”126
Expressing concern over the inherent imprecision in labeling patients as “terminally ill,” which it asserted
is “often impossible ...except in retrospect,” the Court warned that exempting experimental drugs with no
proven eﬀectiveness in the treatment of cancer “would lead to needless deaths and suﬀering among ...patients
characterized as ‘terminal’ who could actually be helped by legitimate therapy.”127
Subsequent cases have applied the reasoning presented by the Court in Rutherford, aﬃrming its conclusion
123Id. at 552.
124Id. at 552-53; see, e.g., 79 Cong. Rec. 5023 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Copeland, sponsor of the 1938 Act); 83 Cong. Rec.
7786-7787, 7789 (1938) (remarks of Reps. Phillips and Lea); 108 Cong. Rec. 17399 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Kefauver).
125442 U.S. at 557-58; see Horwin, supra note 7, at 200 (asserting that the Court in Rutherford was “sensitive to the authority
of the FDA” and its position that only FDA approval can ensure that terminal cancer patients are ensured a “therapeutic
gain”).
126442 U.S. at 556.
127Id. at 556-57 (noting also that “[e]ven critically ill individuals may have unexpected remissions and may respond to
conventional treatment”) (citations omitted).
29that the FDCA contains no exception for terminally ill patients and its caution that ﬁnding otherwise would
subject these “highly vulnerable patients” to the “vast range of self-styled panaceas that inventive minds
can devise.”128 In one such case, Cowan v. United States, the plaintiﬀ, a terminally ill AIDS patient seeking
to gain access to an experimental goat neutralizing antibody drug, did not challenge the applicability of the
FDCA, but asserted that he meets an exception to it and asked the Court to prohibit the FDA from interfering
with the administration of the unapproved drug.129 Following Rutherford, the court rejected plaintiﬀ’s claim
and reaﬃrmed the Supreme Court’s statement of the law under the current statutes and regulations, declaring
that “[p]laintiﬀ’s physician may not administer the goat neutralizing antibody absent prior approval of the
FDA.”130 Adding that although it was sympathetic to plaintiﬀ’s situation, the required course of action for
plaintiﬀ and his physician was to “pursue approval of his Investigational New Drug application as quickly
as possible” and “obtain appropriate approval through the proper regulatory authorities.”131 Lastly, the
court made clear that the decision whether to grant such exemptions from the IND process for terminally
ill patients is one that rests properly with Congress and not with the courts.132
Since Rutherford, lower courts have wrestled with claims by terminal patients that they have a right under
the Constitution to access unapproved medicines, and have consistently struck down such claims, reasserting
the basic principles in Rutherford. While the Supreme Court in Rutherford did not directly address the
claim by plaintiﬀs that they had a constitutionally protected “privacy” right to use laetrile, on remand the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected that claim, ﬁnding that, “although a decision by a patient
whether to have a treatment or not is a protected right, the ‘selection of a particular treatment, or at least
128Cowan v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1242-43 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (citations omitted ).
129See id. at 1239.
130Id. at 1242 (adding that “to permit terminally ill patients to seek any type of treatment regardless of the eﬀectiveness of
such treatment would create a cottage industry existing solely to provide potential panaceas to highly vulnerable patients”).
131Id. at 1243.
132See id.
30a medication, is within the area of governmental interest in protecting public health.”’133 Likewise, other
federal courts have followed the Tenth Circuit’s lead in holding that the selection of a particular treatment or
medicine is not a protected right under the Constitution.134 State courts have similarly rejected terminally
ill patients’ claims based on a constitutionally protected right to privacy, concluding that the right to obtain
unapproved drugs whose eﬃcacy has not been proven is not a fundamental right.135
As a ﬁnal illustration, in Garlic v. Food and Drug Administration, plaintiﬀs suﬀering from Alzheimer’s
disease challenged the FDA’s failure to approve the drug tetrahydroaminoacrinine (THA) as a treatment for
their severely debilitating disease.136 Asserting that the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee them
a right to follow a course of medical treatment designed to “prolong and improve” one’s life, they argued that
the FDA was unconstitutionally interfering with the private importation of the drug.137 While acknowledging
that several courts have recognized that decisions concerning medical treatment are “essentially personal,
and therefore may aﬀect an individual’s right to liberty or privacy,”138 the District Court for the District of
Columbia cited Rutherford and held that plaintiﬀs had not stated a valid claim under the Constitution.139
Expressing sympathy for plaintiﬀs’ “sense of exigency and frustration,” the court reaﬃrmed Rutherford’s
well-established tenet that “the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act makes no special provision for drugs
133Seeley v. State of Washington, 940 P.2d 604, 612 (Wash. 1997) (quoting Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 937 (1980)).
134See Seeley, 940 P.2d at 613; See, e.g., Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1980) (ﬁnding that constitutional
rights of privacy and personal liberty did not give plaintiﬀ the right to get access of laetrile free of lawful exercise of government
police power); Kulsar v. Ambach, 598 F. Supp. 1124 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that patients had no constitutional right
to a drug treatment which the FDA ordered removed from commerce); United States v. Burzynski, 819 F.2d 1301, 1314-15
(5th Cir. 1987) (ﬁnding unsupportable plaintiﬀs’ claim for injunctive relief against interference with interstate distribution of
an unapproved cancer drug, antineoplastons, based on the asserted “constitutional right to obtain medical treatment that is
encompassed by their right to privacy”).
135See, e.g., People v. Privitera, 591 P.2d 919, 925-26 (Cal. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979) (applying a rational basis
analysis where terminally ill cancer patients asserted a right to be treated with an unapproved drug, and ﬁnding that the state
statute met this standard and therefore did not violate the federal constitutional right of privacy); Seeley, 940 P.2d at 613-14
(applying the rational basis standard of review and upholding the challenged legislation categorizing marijuana as a schedule I
controlled substance).
136783 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1992).
137See id. at 5.
138See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1976); New York State Ophthalmological Soc’y v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 1379 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
139See Garlic, 783 F. Supp. at 5.
31used to treat terminally ill patients.”140
D. The Plight of Dr. Burzynski in the War on Cancer
The constant interplay between the courts, Congress, the FDA, and the interested public with respect to the
issue of access by terminally ill patients to unapproved and experimental drugs and treatments is a testament
to the very heated debate that has been kept alive, and, indeed, re-fueled, for much of the twentieth century
and into the twenty-ﬁrst. An illustrative example of the powerful interaction among these key players
is one that began when Stanislaw Burzynski, a Polish-born physician with a doctorate in biochemistry,
discovered a reportedly non-toxic cancer therapy in 1967.141 Escaping communist oppression in his home
country, Burzynski came to the United States in 1970 and began work on his discovery, an alternative cancer
drug called antineoplaston, which simply means “anticancer.”142 Desperately ill cancer patients ﬂocked to
Burzynski and his cancer research institute, seeking to obtain his experimental therapy as a last hope after
traditional chemotherapy and radiation had failed or only intensiﬁed their illnesses.143
Despite the beneﬁts reported by many patients, who claimed that the antineoplastons actually reduced their
tumors and that they had gone into complete remission, without experiencing the dreadful toxic side eﬀects
typically associated with many anticancer drugs, the American Cancer Society added Burzynski’s treatment
to its “unproven methods” blacklist in 1983.144 The FDA entered the ring several months later when it
140Id. (quoting Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 552) (leaving no doubt that “plaintiﬀs must wait for THA to pass the rigorous statutory
and regulatory process designed to ensure that a medication is safe as well as eﬀective before it is marketed to the public”).
141See Sue A. Blevins, FDA: Keeping Medication from Cancer Patients, Regulation, Cato Institute, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1997);
see also David Wagner, Friend or Enemy?, Insight on the News, at 8 (Aug. 17, 1998).
142See Blevins, supra note 141.
143See id. (noting that since 1977 more than 2,500 Americans have sought out Burzynski’s experimental therapy).
144See id.
32sought an injunction against Burzynski’s use of the drug to treat patients because it had not been approved
in accordance with the agency’s new drug approval process under the FDCA. Refusing to issue a broad
injunction against the drug’s use, which would eﬀectively shut down Burzynski’s clinic, the federal judge
allowed the doctor to continue treating patients in Texas, but prohibited him from shipping the drug across
state lines.145 As expected, out-of-state patients came to Texas to be treated by Burzynski and shipped the
drug interstate, leading to a ﬁerce battle between the doctor and the federal government that lasted more
than a decade.
In July of 1985, the government applied for and obtained a warrant to search Burzynski’s clinic as part of
a criminal investigation based on the FDA’s referral to the Department of Justice.146 Patient records and
other property were seized as evidence to show that antineoplastons had been shipped outside the state and
were being distributed in interstate commerce in violation of several federal mandates as well as the district
court’s initial injunction.147 In addition to federal raids on his research facilities, Burzynski was subjected
to three federal grand jury investigations between 1986 and 1994, although none led to an indictment.148
In 1994, the doctor’s endeavor seemed to be looking up, with the FDA even approving his manufacturing
facility and granting him permission to conduct clinical research trials, until Burzynski welcomed a chance to
publicly endorse his treatment by appearing in March of 1995 on the CBS television show “This Morning”
with three of his patients who had apparently beaten terminal cancer after receiving antineoplastons.149
Later that same day federal agents again raided Burzynski’s clinic, and eight months later a federal grand
jury, the fourth to be convened within a span of nine years, handed down an indictment against the doctor,
charging him with 40 courts of distributing an unapproved drug in interstate commerce, 34 counts of mail
145See id.
146See United States v. Burzynski, 819 F.2d at 1305.
147See id.
148See Blevins, supra note 141.
149See id.
33fraud, and one count of contempt of court.150
While the battle waged on in the courtroom, Congress entered the scene the same year when Representative
Joe Barton and his Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Commerce Committee held
hearings during July of 1995 to probe charges that the U.S. Attorney’s oﬃce in Houston and the FDA had
acted improperly and harassed Burzynski through investigations that began in 1983.151 During the hearings,
which addressed alleged abusive and retaliatory practices by the FDA, one of Burzynski’s patients, who had
successfully undergone antineoplaston therapy after being diagnosed with an inoperable brain tumor, oﬀered
dramatic testimony in support of the experimental therapy, asserting, “[i]t’s like I’m at war against cancer,
and the government keeps trying to take away the only weapon I have.”152 Responding to the allegations of
abuse, then-FDA chief David Kessler testiﬁed in November of 1995, denying that any pattern of retaliation
or abuse existed, and, ironically, the 75-count indictment against Burzynski was handed down just ﬁve days
later.153 As the saga continued on multiple fronts, the Burzynski case went to trial in January of 1997, but
ended with a hung jury just two months later, with the judge dismissing the mail fraud charges and federal
prosecutors dropping the 40 counts of unauthorized distribution.154 In May of 1997, a second federal trial
to address Burzynski’s lone remaining contempt charge resulted in an acquittal after just three hours of jury
deliberation.155
While Burzynski’s 14-year battle with the FDA may have appeared to be over, the “miracle” doctor and
150See id.; see also Wagner, supra note 141, at 8 (noting that the doctor’s appearance on television is when “[t]hings took a
turn for the worse for Burzynski, when he seized an opportunity to promote his cause the American way – through the media”).
151See Wagner, supra note 141, at 8; see also Blevins, supra note 141.
152See Wagner, supra note 141, at 8.
153See id.
154See id.; see also Sue A. Blevins, FDA’s War on Dr. Burzynski and His Patients: Physician and Patients Win!, Medical
Sentinel, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1998), at 135.
155See id.
34his experimental “cure” ﬁnally victorious, the controversy rages on, as Burzynski’s patients, as well as other
desperately ill patients in search of a last chance at life, continue to plead with Congress to reign in the FDA’s
control over terminally ill patients’ access to experimental drugs.156 For example, in 1998 Representative
Barton led a new set of hearings concerning FDA abuses before the House Committee on Government Re-
form and Oversight. Addressing the Committee, the father of a 6-year-old patient of Burzynski dramatically
asserted, “[f]rom the time we went to Dr. Burzynski [for antineoplaston treatment], the biggest threat to [my
son’s] life was not cancer, it was the FDA,” and scolded the FDA’s “cold disregard for the life of [his] son and
Dr. Burzynski’s other terminal cancer patients,” as well as the “legal maneuvers” it employed to stop them
from receiving the treatment.157 Such tactics, he claimed, were both “un-American and unconstitutional,”
and it was Congress’ job to put an end to them once and for all.158
Since the unfolding of the case of Dr. Burzynski, similar allegations of abuse and calls for action have been
recorded in congressional hearings, and an increasing number of members of Congress have joined the debate,
many of whom have expressed concern over the “inherent injustice in preventing cancer victims from having
the medical freedom to try to save their lives.”159 For example, one Congressman, prompted by the many
phone calls and letters his oﬃce had received regarding the plight of Dr. Burzynski, testiﬁed that “[w]hatever
the FDA’s concerns are, the problem remains they are denying patients with life-threatening diseases access
to this [experimental] therapy,” and “fail to recognize that people’s lives and rights are being trampled in
this process.”160 In an emotional appeal for change in the face of life-or-death circumstances, he pleaded
that “as we continue down the path toward FDA reform, let us be mindful of patients with life-threatening
diseases who are grasping at their last hopes to continue to live.”161
156See Blevins, FDA’s War on Dr. Burzynski and His Patients, supra note 154, at 135.
157Id. (citing the congressional testimony of Jack Kunnari, the father of 6-year-old Dustin Kunnari).
158Id.
159Horwin, supra note 7, at 201.
160FDA Does Not Serve Public By Denying Treatment of Last Resort Pursued by Terminally Ill Patients, 142 Cong. Rec. H.
4115 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1996) (statement of Rep. Pallone).
161Id.
35Even after Burzynski had been cleared of all charges his story remained a heated backdrop for continued
congressional debate regarding patient access to experimental treatments and legislation to promote it.162
Accompanying such discussions has been an undying concern for the protection of human subjects in ex-
perimental clinical research. For example, in a 1997 hearing before the House Subcommittee on Human
Resources, the Deputy Commissioner and Senior Advisor to the FDA Commissioner, Mary Pendergast, dis-
cussed the FDA’s policies concerning the protection of human research subjects and emerging issues involving
access to experimental treatments and informed consent.163 Setting out the basic structure for human re-
search protection in the U.S. and the interconnection between the FDA and Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) regulations,164 Pendergast highlighted the FDA’s vigilance in protecting the rights
and welfare of human research subjects, asserting that the “[FDA] take[s] no human right more seriously
than the protection of people enrolled in clinical trials.”165
E. Legislative Proposals for Expanded Access: The Access to Medical Treatment Act
In 1998, a series of hearings were held to address ways to expand access to investigational and alternative
therapies for seriously ill and dying patients, including new “legislation that would give all Americans the
162See, e.g., The Plight of Dr. Stanislaw Burzynski, 143 Cong. Rec. H. 5176 (daily ed. July 11, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Pallone) (calling the government’s conduct in Burzynski’s case “disturbing” and its treatment of Burzynski “reprehensible,”
adding that the government “placed cancer patients at jeopardy at one point” and “badly utilized” taxpayer money and
resources).
163See Biomedical Ethics: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Government Reform
and Oversight, 105th Cong. (May 8, 1997) (statement of Mary K. Pendergast, Deputy Commissioner and Senior Advisor to
the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, U.S. Food and Drug Administration) (hereinafter “Pendergast testimony”).
164Both the FDA and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have regulations addressing the protection of
human research subjects (20 C.F.R. Parts 50 and 56 for FDA; 45 C.F.R. Part 46 for HHS). While the HHS regulations apply
to research that is conducted or supported by HHS and are implemented by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the FDA
regulations apply to human subject research involving products regulated by the FDA, whether the research is privately or
publicly funded. Although the FDA and HHS regulations are essentially identical, the two agencies apply them in ways that
reﬂect their distinct missions (e.g., NIH implements the HHS regulations through assurances made by the institutions where the
research is done, while FDA regulates the investigators who conduct the research and the IRBs that review proposed research
studies). Both sets of regulations apply where a research project is conducted or supported by HHS and involves a product
regulated by FDA. In sum, they are “complementary and together they set forth criteria that are needed to protect research
subjects.” Pendergast testimony at 6.
165Id. at 4.
36freedom to choose their own medicines.”166 One piece of proposed legislation, entitled “The Access to Medical
Treatment Act” (“AMTA”), has been repeatedly introduced in Congress since 1993.167 Generating much
debate over the years since its ﬁrst introduction in Congress, AMTA provides that patients may be treated
by any licensed healthcare practitioner with any method of medical treatment the patient desires, even if the
treatment has not yet been approved by the FDA, and provided that a comprehensive list of requirements
are met.168 For example, Section 3 of the proposed legislation requires the healthcare practitioner to use
“generally accepted principles and current information” to conclude that the unapproved drug, when used
as directed, will not cause a danger to the patient, to inform the patient that the drug is not approved by the
FDA, to allow the patient suﬃcient opportunity to consider whether or not to use the drug and to minimize
the possibility of coercion or undue inﬂuence when making a recommendation to the patient, to disclose
any ﬁnancial interest that he or she may have in the drug, and to adhere to stringent informed consent
procedures set forth in the legislation.169
The increased access to experimental treatments available under AMTA has been applauded by groups such
as the American Association for Health Freedom, which claims that the legislation is necessary “to stop the
legal harassment many alternative practitioners face from the FDA and state medical boards.”170 Other
advocates assert that AMTA is necessary “because of the FDA’s—and the pharmaceutical industry’s—
166Clinical Trial Subjects: Adequate FDA Protections: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Government Reform and
Oversight, 106th Cong. (Apr. 22, 1998) (statement of Dan L. Burton, Chairman, House Comm. on Government Reform and
Oversight).
167See S. 1955, 106 Cong. (1999); H.R. 746, 105 Cong. (1997); S. 578, 105 Cong. (1997); H.R. 2019, 104 Cong. (1995-96);
S. 1035, 104 Cong. (1995-96); H.R. 4696, 103 Cong. (1993-94); H.R. 4499, 103 Cong. (1993-94); see also Horwin, supra note
7, at 201 (presenting the comments of Senator Bob Dole, an original co-sponsor of the legislation: “In a free market system, it
seems to make sense to make available non-harmful alternative medical treatments to individuals who desire such treatments,
without the Federal Government standing in the way.”).
168See “Access to Medical Treatment Act,” 2001 H.R. 1964, S. 1378, 107th Cong. (2001); see also Blevins, FDA: Keeping
Medication from Cancer Patients, supra note 141 (maintaining that the Access to Medical Treatment Act addresses the issue
which stands at the crux of the problem with most regulations today, namely, that “they restrict the freedom of individuals to
engage in voluntary transactions”).
169See “Access to Medical Treatment Act,” 107th Cong. § 3; see also Horwin, supra note 7, at 201 (outlining the requirements
of the legislation).
170Sue A. Blevins, Legalize Alternative Medicine, Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA) (Mar. 28, 1996), at 20.
37entrenched hostility to new treatments.”171 These proponents attack the increasing inﬂuence of the drug
industry over the FDA, particularly through the use of user fees that pharmaceutical companies must pay to
ﬁle new drug applications with the FDA under the Prescription Drug User Fee Act.172 Other advocates focus
on the FDA’s “unnecessary and unwanted” interference in the personal health decisions of Americans. House
Representative Dan Burton voiced this objection succinctly during a congressional hearing on alternative
medicines, asserting, “Americans do not need the government, in this case the FDA, telling them how to treat
their illnesses, especially when state-level protections are already in place to safeguard the public from those
who might do harm to patients.”173 Moreover, Burton characterized the FDA’s process for patient access
to unapproved and experimental treatments as “a good example of the nature of the federal government to
micromanage the lives of individual Americans, often unnecessarily.”174
On the other side of the debate, critics respond by arguing that the AMTA would pose serious risks to con-
sumers who will have access to possibly dangerous treatments and therapies. Thus, critics remain steadfast
in their belief that all drugs should be required to go through the FDA’s approval process before consumers
can gain access to them.175 During a series of congressional hearings in 1998 addressing clinical trials and
patient safety, one FDA insider aptly voiced his concerns with AMTA, warning that the proposed legislation
“would lower the standard for safety, thus putting patients at unnecessary risk,” and would have at least
three unintended and severe consequences: (1) the bill would reduce, or wholly eliminate, the critical pro-
171Wagner, supra note 141, at 8.
172See id. Those opposed to the imposition of user fees claim that industry funding of the FDA through such fees undermines
the credibility and independence of the FDA. They argue that the imposition of user fees has made the FDA too close to
the pharmaceutical industry, which has pressured the FDA to approve drugs too quickly, and that the industry is essentially
“buying” drug approvals, and thus compromising the entire review and approval process.
173Alternative Medicines: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong. (Feb. 12,
1998) (statement of Dan L. Burton, Chairman, House Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight).
174Id. Burton explained that access to unapproved drugs and therapies in the development process generally requires partici-
pation in a clinical trial. However, if a patient does not meet the strict guidelines established for a trial, his or her access may
be entirely “shut oﬀ, with no appeal,” with the FDA making the “life or death decision as to whether a patient can have the
treatment under a special exception.”
175See Wagner, supra note 141, at 8.
38cess of scientiﬁc data collection necessary to establish the safety and eﬀectiveness of a product; (2) the bill
would diminish any assurance of appropriate informed consent and human subject protection; and (3) the
bill would make it extremely diﬃcult to protect consumers against health fraud.176 Moreover, this AMTA
critic stressed the FDA’s eﬀorts to balance two compelling factors: the controlled study necessary to identify
treatments that may improve patients’ health, and the desire of terminally and seriously ill patients, with no
eﬀective options available, to have the earliest access to unapproved and experimental drugs and treatments
that could be the best therapy for them.177 Emphasizing the former factor, another critic concerned with
AMTA’s potential implications oﬀered this plea for more rigorous drug testing:
Without extensive drug testing we just can’t tell which hand holds a dangerous poison, and
which conceals the life saving drug. Without proper testing even a potentially life saving
treatment may be harmful if given in the wrong dose, or to the wrong patients. I want people
to have choices too. But they should have real choices, involving scientiﬁc data about how
much harm and good various treatment alternatives can be expected to achieve. We have
a [sic] only one proven solution. We need public policies to promote more drug testing, not
still more new loopholes that could endanger the health and safety of millions of people.178
After several unsuccessful attempts to pass AMTA in Congress, it seems clear thus far that the majority of
congressman and senators believe that the risks outweigh the potential beneﬁts in permitting patients the
freedom to access the medical treatments of their choice.179 But while critics remain staunchly opposed,
AMTA advocates will undoubtedly continue to focus their energies on achieving its passage, most likely
invoking emotional pleas by terminally ill patients and their families who view AMTA as a giant step
toward increased access to treatments that oﬀer one last hope for survival.180 For example, testifying at yet
another congressional hearing addressing access to experimental and alternative treatments, one impassioned
176Clinical Trials and Patient Safety: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight, 105 Cong.
(Apr. 22, 1998) (testimony of Michael A. Friedman, M.D., Lead Deputy Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration).
177Id. (adding that the FDA’s primary concern with the AMTA is that it would weaken the protections of the FDCA, and,
speciﬁcally, that it would limit the FDA’s ability to ensure “reasonable safety, eﬀectiveness, informed consent, and scientiﬁc
data collection”).
179See Horwin, supra note 7, at 201.
180See, e.g., Legislative Priorities for the 107th Congress: Access to Medical Treatment Act – HR 1964/S1378, American
Association for Health Freedom, at http://healthfreedom.net (last visited Mar. 31, 2003).
39supporter of expanded access recounted her battle against a fatal cancer and the successful, yet experimental
and unapproved, treatment she received from Dr. Burzynski only after several physicians had issued her a
death sentence and absolutely no hope under conventional therapies. Speaking from personal experience,
she poignantly questioned the FDA’s policy toward experimental drug approval for the terminally ill, asking
the committee convened that day, “Who gave FDA the right to play God? Was it the intent of Congress to
give FDA the kind of power it exercises over life and death with no accountability? By denying terminally ill
cancer patients access to antineoplastons, this agency literally decides ‘who shall live and who shall die.”’181
Whether one is a proponent or a critic of expanding access to experimental drugs and therapies for terminally
ill patients, there is one issue of concern upon which all participants in the debate can agree: there must
be adequate safeguards in place for the protection of subjects who take part in clinical research and trials.
In the next section I will explore the federal regulations governing research involving human subjects, and,
speciﬁcally, research involving certain “vulnerable” classes, as well as the application of the current regulatory
framework to one class in particular: the terminally ill.
VI. The Terminally Ill as a “Vulnerable” Population?
The regulations governing clinical research, in addition to the provisions applicable to all research, provide
additional safeguards for certain “vulnerable populations, such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, hand-
icapped, or mentally disabled persons, or economically or educationally disadvantaged persons.”182 Citing
the same “special” populations, the regulations additionally provide that “[w]hen some or all of the subjects,
..., are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue inﬂuence,” the IRB involved must ensure that “addi-
181Alternative Medicines: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong. (Feb. 4,
1998) (statement of Mary Jo Siegel).
18221 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(3).
40tional safeguards have been included in the study to protect the rights and welfare of these subjects.”183 The
additional protections available to these subjects can generally be separated into three types: (1) structural
provisions addressing how IRBs will be comprised and who will make decisions; (2) substantive provisions
governing the types of research that will be allowed; and (3) procedural provisions to guarantee that no
research is done without the voluntary and informed consent of subjects.184
In order to ensure that members of the IRBs adequately represent the interests of certain “vulnerable”
subjects, the regulations provide that “[i]f an IRB regularly reviews research that involves a vulnerable cate-
gory of subjects, such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, or handicapped or mentally disabled persons,
consideration shall be given to the inclusion of one or more individuals who are knowledgeable about and
experienced in working with those subjects.”185 In addition, the types of research that are approved by IRBs
will depend on the presence of vulnerable populations. Similarly, the presence of vulnerable subjects signals
a requirement of heightened scrutiny to guarantee the informed consent before research may begin, as well
as throughout the research process.186
Although the regulations use the term “vulnerable” to identify subjects who may need additional protections,
they do not explicitly deﬁne the term. Rather than providing speciﬁc criteria with which to deﬁne “vulner-
able” populations, the regulations instead oﬀer examples of the types of subjects who may be considered
vulnerable.187 However, it is possible to divide into two groups the types of “vulnerability” to which the reg-
ulations seem to apply: vulnerability due to circumstances and vulnerability due to cognitive defects.188 For
183Id. § 56.111(b).
184See Addicott, supra note 19, at 485.
18521 C.F.R. § 56.107(a).
186See id. § 56.111; see also Addicott, supra note 19, at 486-88 (describing some of the “general provisions designed to protect
any human subject who may be vulnerable to coercion or undue inﬂuence”).
187See Addicott, supra note 19, at 486-87 (noting that even when the current regulations were ﬁrst proposed after an extensive
review of the then-existing regulatory scheme, neither the Department of Health and Human Services nor the President’s
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research provided any speciﬁc
guidance or criteria with which to deﬁne vulnerable populations).
188See Jessica W. Berg et al., Informed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical Practice 266-67 (2d ed., Oxford University Press,
2001).
41example, the former category includes prisoners, pregnant women, and economically disadvantaged persons,
while the latter category encompasses children and mentally disadvantaged persons.189 While such classiﬁ-
cations may plausibly be made, the categories may frequently overlap and any lines drawn undoubtedly will
become blurred.190
While the regulations provide explicit protections for certain “vulnerable” populations, terminally ill subjects
must seek any additional safeguards in the general provisions applicable to all “vulnerable” populations, and
whether and to what extent these rules apply is open to question.191 Those who oppose the inclusion of ter-
minally ill subjects as a “vulnerable” population emphasize the fact that the relevant regulatory framework
and the oﬃcial government documents neither list nor discuss the terminally ill in such terms. Moreover,
they claim that characterizing the terminally ill as vulnerable would further stigmatize those already suﬀering
from loss of personal dignity and autonomy.192
Responding to the above arguments against the inclusion of the terminally ill as a “vulnerable” population
in the regulations, one IRB member notes that “[m]any research subjects are vulnerable simply because they
are ill,” and adds that the vulnerability of ill patients “depends on the gravity of their illness and their level
of desperation.”193 Similarly, advocates for this position have continued to point to characteristics shared
by the terminally ill and “vulnerable” populations such as prisoners and children. For instance, Jay Katz
asserts, “[l]ike children, [terminally ill patients’] ability to make informed decisions is often either impaired
or disregarded, and, like soldiers and prisoners, they are ...‘captives’ of their disease, their physicians and
189See id. at 266.
190See id. at 266-67 (citing as an example of overlapping categories a 1999 case that involved psychiatric research on teenage
prison inmates).
191See Addicott, supra note 19, at 492 (asserting that the terminally ill, unlike children, pregnant women, fetuses, and
prisoners, have no dedicated regulations to guarantee that they are not victimized in unethical research).
192See id. at 492-93 (noting, however, that to conclude that their judgment is impaired by these factors would demean them
as well as discredit reality).
193See Moore, supra note 22, at 565-66.
42hospital, and their enforced isolation.”194 Likewise, a former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine
expressed well the source of the vulnerability of terminally ill subjects when he noted that “[t]he thumb
screws of coercion are most relentlessly applied ...[to] the most used and useful of all experimental subjects,
the patient with disease.”195
While the regulations fail to deﬁne the term “vulnerable,” leaving the category open-ended allows IRBs
to assess the vulnerability of the subjects involved and to determine whether or not the regulations are
applicable. One commentator notes that the fact that the examples of vulnerable populations provided in
the regulations vary from provision to provision suggests that the types of subjects listed were “meant to
be illustrative, rather than denominative.”196 Indeed, the regulations refer to vulnerable subjects in several
provisions and oﬀer a slightly diﬀerent image of who these subjects are in each provision.197 For example, the
section addressing the rules of IRB membership lists as vulnerable categories of subjects “children, prisoners,
pregnant women, or handicapped or mentally disabled persons.”198 Meanwhile, the section setting forth the
criteria for IRB approval of research lists as vulnerable populations “children, prisoners, pregnant women,
handicapped, or mentally disabled persons, or economically or educationally disadvantaged persons.”199
Lastly, the regulations provide explicit guidelines and additional safeguards for research with three speciﬁc
categories of subjects: pregnant women and fetuses, prisoners, and children.200
In addition, while formal government publications lack explicit references to additional protections for termi-
194Jay Katz, Experimentation with Human Beings 1053 (1972); see Joni N. Gray et al.,
Ethical and Legal Issues in AIDS Research 52 (1995) (stating that “[t]o be sure, research participants with fatal illnesses are
vulnerable in many ways”).
195Franz J. Ingelﬁnger, Informed (but Uneducated) Consent, 287 New Eng. J. Med. 465, 466 (1972).
196Addicott, supra note 19, at 493.
197See Moore, supra note 22, at 568 (adding that the sources of these groups’ vulnerabilities, including institutionalization
and diminished decision-making capacity, vary).
19821 C.F.R. § 56.107(a).
199Id. § 56.111(a)(3).
20045 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-46.211, 46.301-46.306, 46.401-46.409.
43nally ill subjects,201 there are indications in early publications that regulators were cognizant of the special
concerns related to research with this population. The Belmont Report, for example, speciﬁcally mentioned
the terminally ill as a potentially “incompetent” group, providing that “[e]ach class of subjects that one
might consider as incompetent (e.g., infants and young children, mentally disabled patients, the terminally
ill and the comatose) should be considered on its own terms.”202
As a result, many commentators claim that the terminally ill do in fact fall into the “vulnerable” population
category under the regulations, and point to a number of features shared by the terminally ill with the
vulnerable populations explicitly mentioned in the provisions. Such characteristics, in turn, make terminally
ill patients who may be considering whether to take part in clinical research extremely vulnerable to coercion,
exploitation, and undue inﬂuence.203 As one commentator noted in his discussion on patients’ perceptions
of illness and suﬀering, “[i]t is natural for a sick person to perceive that he or she has become isolated from
the rest of the community, to feel vulnerable and mortal.”204 This feeling of isolation and estrangement from
relationships with others leads the terminal patient to question his or her own capacity to act autonomously
with regard to others. In this way, recognizing that illness is a source of diminished autonomy, terminal
patients may be more willing to entrust their doctors with signiﬁcant decision-making authority, believing
that they themselves are incapable of rational, independent decision-making.205
While the regulations provide speciﬁc guidelines for certain “special” populations, including pregnant women
201See Addicott, supra note 19, at 492-93; see generally, e.g., President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical Research, Implementing Human Research Regulations: The Adequacy and Uniformity of Federal
Rules and of Their Implementation (1983); Food and Drug Administration, Current Issues in Human Subject Protection
(1996).
202Belmont Report at 13 (emphasis added).
203See Addicott, supra note 19, at 496.
204Robert M. Timko, Clinical Ethics: Due Care and the Principle of Nonmaleﬁcence 85 (University Press of America, Inc.,
2001).
205See id. at 86 (emphasizing the “anomie, depression, and sense of estrangement from one’s life-plan that occur with the
onset and development of illness,” and which lead to a loss of autonomy); see also Addicott, supra note 19, at 496 (noting that
the psychological response of terminal patients after diagnosis may be exacerbated by the physiological symptoms of the illness,
and patients may be reluctant to question the authority of their doctors).
44and fetuses, prisoners, and children, the common thread that seems to run through these groups is the
concern that their vulnerability to coercive pressures and undue inﬂuence limits, if not wholly eradicates,
their ability to give truly voluntary consent. The terminally ill share characteristics with these groups that
render them more susceptible to coercion and outside inﬂuence, which should call into serious question
the suﬃciency of the informed consent model as applied to research with terminally ill subjects. Given
these concerns, two elements of informed consent must be considered in order to understand the protections
accorded to vulnerable populations: information and voluntariness.206 As applied to children or the mentally
handicapped, for example, the issue is whether they can adequately understand the information provided
in order to rationally decide whether to participate in the research. As applied to prisoners, on the other
hand, the question is whether their consent can in fact be given voluntarily due to the inherently conﬁning
and coercive nature of prison.207 These two concerns, in turn, may both be present in the case of research
with terminally ill subjects. Like children or the mentally handicapped, terminally ill patients are often
considered incapable of making rational, informed decisions; and like prisoners, they are often seen as not
“really” free, but instead as “captive” to their illness and the coercive circumstances in which they ﬁnd
themselves.208 Viewed in these terms, such analogies suggest that similar procedural protections as those
provided to children and prisoners should also be available to the terminally ill.
In order to fully explore the vulnerabilities shared by terminally ill patients and the “vulnerable” populations
explicitly mentioned in the regulations, it may be useful to consider more closely the reality experienced by
terminally ill individuals. One writer has suggested that cancer and AIDS have perhaps become linked as
206See Addicott, supra note 19, at 485.
207See id. at 485-86.
208See Garnett, supra note 87, at 482 (expressing concerns that terminally ill patients “might submit to quackery in a hopeless
and desperate attempt to beat the inevitable,” or “out of misplaced or entirely genuine altruism,” and the fear that the “ritual
of informed consent” is often viewed as a mere formality rather than “an opportunity for choice or a vehicle for empowerment”).
45the two most feared ways to die, and notes that cancer, like AIDS, “leads to a hard death,” adding that
“[t]he most terrifying illnesses are those perceived not just as lethal but as dehumanizing, literally so.”209
The “universal fears” of cancer patients have been termed “the six Ds: death, dependency, disﬁgurement,
disability interfering with normal life functions, disruption of relationships, and discomfort or pain resulting
from the disease itself.”210 Moreover, the prevalence of psychiatric disorders in terminal cancer patients
has been well documented. In one study in which 215 cancer patients were selected at random, forty-seven
percent of the patients suﬀered from psychiatric disorders.211
In addition to the psychological symptoms of illness, the physiological symptoms may further impair the
cognitive function and mental status of the terminal patient. For instance, with cancer patients, “fatigue,
recovery from surgery and radiation, [and] toxicity from drugs (including antibiotics and pain medicine)
may all alter thinking ability, dampening the sharpness, rapidity, and productivity of the [patient’s] thought
processes.”212 Frequent hospitalization, not uncommon for terminally ill patients, may also contribute to
their diminishing sense of control over their environment and decision-making ability. Similar to prisoners,
a “vulnerable” population under the regulations, hospitalized patients become entirely dependent on the
institution’s staﬀ and undoubtedly develop a sense of helplessness and apathy with respect to their situation
and any treatment decisions that must be made.213 The hopelessness that often blurs the terminal cancer
patient’s cognitive abilities likely strikes at the heart of the informed consent model. As one commentator
notes, terminally ill patients who become depressed may be more likely to consent to take part in research
209Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and its Metaphors 126 (1990).
210Addicott, supra note 19, at 499.
211See id. at 499-500 (noting that of the patients with disorders, sixty-eight percent had “adjustment disorder with depressed,
anxious, or mixed mood; 13% had major depression; 8% had an organic mental disorder; 7% had a personality disorder; and
4% had anxiety disorder”) (footnotes omitted).
212See id. at 500 (quoting Stephen P. Hersh, Death From The Cancers, in Living With Grief When Illness is Prolonged 100
(Kenneth J. Doka & Joyce Davidson eds., 1998)).
213See id. at 501.
46because the concept of risk is meaningless to them. In particular, “they become malleable and vulnerable to
coercion precisely because they do not care whether they live or die.”214
As this utter hopelessness leads many terminally ill patients to latch on to the mantra that they have
“nothing to lose,” it is not surprising that they frequently ignore the potential risks and blindly consent to
participate in research due to a phenomenon known as “therapeutic misconception.” In particular, desperate
patients often fail to understand that they are taking part in research that may not be intended primarily
for their beneﬁt, perhaps completely unaware that the research is meant to study toxicity levels of drugs and
dose schedules, not to cure their illnesses.215 One commentator focuses on the “self-deception inherent in
seeing experimentation as treatment, especially in terminally ill cancer patients” who participate in Phase
I drug studies with anticancer agents.216 While researchers at the National Cancer Institute refer to such
studies as “potentially therapeutic,” FDA regulations provide that Phase I studies are intended to have
no therapeutic content, but rather are to determine “toxicity, metabolism, absorption, elimination, and
other pharmacological action, preferred route of administration, and safe dosage range.”217 As a result,
Phase I trials are transformed into “experimental therapy,” eradicating altogether the distinction between
experimentation and therapy.218 Not surprisingly, a number of commentators have criticized the conﬂation
of research and treatment, the doubling of researchers and physicians, subjects and patients, and have
little, if any, regard for the distinction, exempliﬁed in the Helsinki Declaration, between therapeutic and
214Id. at 502-03 (asserting that terminally ill patients may, in their desperation, fail to even attempt to evaluate the risks and
beneﬁts of experimental research, “having already made up their minds to try any available treatment).
215See id. at 503-04. Addicott describes one study in which investigators examined the motivation and understanding of
patients participating in Phase I cancer trials. The results of the study showed that patients were motivated to take part in
the research almost exclusively because of a belief that it would make them better. See generally Christopher K. Daugherty et
al., Perceptions of Cancer Patients and Their Physicians Involved in Phase I Trials, 13 J. Clin. Oncol. 1062-72 (1995).
216Annas, supra note 83, at 310.
217Id. at 310-311 (quoting The President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, Protecting Human Subjects 65 (1981)).
218Id. at 311 (adding that roughly 94% of researchers admit that adult patients enroll in Phase I studies largely for the
possible medical beneﬁt); see Eric Kodish et al., Ethical Issues in Phase I Oncology Research: A Comparison of Investigators
and Institutional Review Board Chairpersons, 10 J. Clinical Oncology 1810, 1812 (1992); Mortimer B. Lipsett, On the Nature
and Ethics of Phase I Clinical Trials of Cancer Chemotherapies, 248 JAMA 941, 941-42 (1982).
47non-therapeutic research.219
VII. Terminal Patients Speak for Themselves: Advocates for a “Right of Access”
Although the vulnerabilities shared by the terminally ill and certain groups explicitly mentioned in the reg-
ulations may support the calls for additional safeguards for terminally ill subjects who choose to participate
in research trials, perhaps one of the groups that most vigorously opposes regulatory restrictions is the one
they are intended to protect: the terminally ill. Not only are terminally ill patients, who often view exper-
imental therapies as their last chance to beat the inevitable, generally willing to take part in research, but
they often compete for the chance to do so.220 Desperately ill cancer patients, for example, may believe that
it is in their interest to gain access to experimental treatments, and, indeed, in some cases it is rational to
want to try an unapproved drug when, compared with the alternative, the potential beneﬁts justify the risks
involved.221
Advocates for expanded access to experimental treatments for the terminally ill claim that the freedom of
each patient to choose his or her weapons of choice is critical to each patient’s personal dignity, autonomy,
and control over his or her body.222 The calls for a comprehensive “right of access” to experimental therapies
raise two distinct issues: (1) whether the current FDCA regulations should apply without modiﬁcation to
the terminally or seriously ill, and (2) whether constitutionally protected liberty or privacy interests exist to
219See Annas, supra note 83, at 310-312; see also Robert J. Levine, Ethics and Regulation of Clinical Research 8-10 (2d ed.,
Urban & Schwarzenberg, 1986).
220See Addicott, supra note 19, at 493-94.
221See Robert M. Veatch, From Nuremberg Through the 1990s: The Priority of Autonomy, in
The Ethics of Research Involving Human Subjects: Facing the 21st Century 55-56 (Harold Y. Vanderpool ed., 1996) (posing
the question whether a priority for autonomy gives terminally ill individuals a right of access to experimental agents, not only
over-the-counter agents such as aspirin, but also restricted drugs controlled by investigational new drug research).
222See, e.g., Perrin, supra note 39, at 121 (noting that when the desperately ill patient exhausts all available conventional
therapies cannot gain access to an experimental or investigational therapy, his or her plight is clear: the “patient is destined to
suﬀer or die”).
48protect the right to choose unapproved or experimental treatments.223 As Marshall’s opinion in Rutherford
illustrates, the FDCA makes no exception for experimental or unapproved drugs used to treat the termi-
nally ill, and thus the safety and eﬃcacy requirements are applicable to such patients without exemption or
modiﬁcation.224
With respect to the second issue, whether a constitutionally protected privacy interest encompasses the
right of access to unapproved or experimental treatments, some advocates have embraced the claim that
the right to privacy is fundamental and “protects the individual from unwarranted governmental intrusions
into certain personal decisions ...that have some relation to child rearing and education, contraception,
marriage, family relationships and procreation.”225 Speciﬁcally, advocates for this reading to support a right
to experimental therapies assert that the right to privacy should include the personal therapeutic choices of
the seriously or terminally ill for three reasons: (1) the freedom to care for one’s health is of a highly personal
nature that should ultimately rest with the individual; (2) a regulation denying access to unapproved drugs
severely interferes with the lifestyle of the terminally ill patient; and (3) only the terminally ill person is
aﬀected by the decision to choose experimental and unapproved drugs.226
In addition to expanding the privacy argument to encompass the right of access, some commentators have
pointed to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution to support their claim that the freedom
of each citizen to choose a treatment of choice in ﬁghting a terminal illness is a basic liberty to which they
cannot be deprived. In the words of one commentator, the U.S. government, “through the FDA, deprives
[terminally ill patients] of their interests in life and liberty by precluding them from obtaining life-extending
drugs or by coercing them to participate in placebo studies.”227 Embracing the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
223See id. at 123.
224See 442 U.S. 544.
225Scott H. Power, The Right of Privacy in Choosing Medical Treatment: Should Terminally Ill Persons Have Access to Drugs
Not Yet Approved by the Food and Drug Administration?, 20 J. Marshall L. Rev. 693, 703-04 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
226Id. at 705.
227Bret L. Lansdale, A Procedural Due Process Attack on FDA Regulations: Getting New Drugs to People With AIDS, 18
Hastings Const. L.Q. 417, 419 (1991); see Perrin, supra note 39, at 151 (citing as support for advocate’s calls for a “right to
49ments’ due process guarantees, courts should therefore acknowledge a terminally ill patient’s “due process
right of access to new, potentially life-extending drugs.”228 Following that line of reasoning, another propo-
nent of the “right of access” asserts that “[i]t would be illogical in the extreme to hold, on the one hand, that
a person has a constitutional right to refuse treatment needed to sustain life (Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)) and, on the other, that a person has no constitutional right to receive
a treatment that may sustain life.”229 Seizing upon language from Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in
Cruzan, where the Court held that the Due Process Clause does not require the state to repose judgment on
matters concerning the right to refuse treatment with anyone but the patient herself,230 one commentator
ﬁnds support in the analogy between the terminally ill patient who chooses to refuse life-saving treatment
and the terminally ill patient who wishes to receive a treatment that may sustain life, oﬀering as support
O’Connor’s powerful words in that opinion: “A seriously ill or dying patient whose wishes are not honored
may feel a captive of the machinery required for life-sustaining measures or other medical interventions. Such
forced treatment may burden that individual’s liberty interests as much as any state coercion.”231
Finally, the calls for a comprehensive “right of access” have embraced autonomy as an “absolute priority,” a
liberty right enjoyed both by researchers and patients, which must be respected.232 Speaking to this propo-
sition, one commentator asserts, “[i]f investigators were willing to cooperate with subjects who had rational,
subjective preferences for [investigational new drug] agents, then their autonomy as well as that of the sub-
jects would support their providing the agents to them.”233 Moreover, labeling certain patients, including
access” the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law).
228Lansdale, supra note 227, at 419.
229Government v. The Terminally Ill, Letter from Jonathan W. Emord, Attorney, Emord & Associates, P.C., Counsel to
the Burzynski Patient Organization, in Regulation, The Cato Review of Business and Government, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1997),
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg20n2-let.html (hereinafter “Letter from Jonathan W. Emord”) (asserting
that “[w]hen the state denies a terminally ill patient freedom to elect a course of treatment, deprives that patient of bodily
integrity, robs that patient of control over his or her person, and eﬀectively dictates one therapy, there is little left of liberty”).
230See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
231See Letter from Jonathan W. Emord, supra note 229 (quoting O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 288).
232See Veatch, supra note 221, at 56-57.
233Id. at 56.
50metastatic cancer patients, as “among the worst-oﬀ members of society,” this advocate for access declares
that “these patients have an entitlement-right claim to access to experimental agents,” and, furthermore,
“[i]f they are plausible among the least well-oﬀ, they have claims of justice that may override the autonomy
of the investigators.”234 Thus, in such circumstances, the principle of autonomy eﬀectively disappears and
the investigators’ “moral duty to help the least well-oﬀ gain access to experimental treatments” takes center
stage in the patient’s ﬁght to live.235 It is justice, and not mere social beneﬁcence, that guides this view; in
sum, “[i]t is what we owe to the least well-oﬀ among us.”236
VIII. Conclusion
The FDA, through the development of the current regulatory regime and ethical guidelines, has attempted
to strike an appropriate balance between two compelling values: promoting access to new, experimental
and potentially life-saving therapies for the terminally ill, and protecting this unique class of subjects from
research abuse and coercion. Advocates for increased access may ask, “[w]hy should terminal patients, who
according to orthodox medicine will die, be prevented from accessing non-orthodox therapies through their
medical doctors?”237 In particular, if a patient understands that the treatment has not been approved by
the FDA and that the risks and beneﬁts cannot be fully identiﬁed or quantiﬁed, and nonetheless gives his





237Horwin, supra note 7, at 222.
238Id. at 222-23.
51On the other side of the spectrum, those concerned with the particular vulnerabilities that often characterize
the terminally ill urge that more stringent regulatory protections should be in place for such patients, who
frequently are individuals “desperate for a cure and [who] often suﬀer from depression, anxiety, or other
psychological disorders that may be exacerbated by the physiological symptoms of their illnesses.”239 As a
result, proponents of heightened standards for research involving the terminally ill have proposed a number
of additional safeguards and regulatory reforms to better ensure the safety and protection of terminally ill
subjects, including an explicit recognition in the regulations of the terminally ill as a “vulnerable” population,
which at a minimum would alert researchers and IRBs “to familiarize themselves with the unique diﬃculties
their subjects face,” as well as a requirement in the regulations that psychological evaluations and subject
advocates are employed to protect the integrity of the informed consent process.240
While rational individuals will come to diﬀerent conclusions as to how the balance should be struck, perhaps
one primary beneﬁt to be gained from engaging in the debate is that through such discussions we will
undoubtedly become more aware of the diverse interests and values at stake, and therefore better able to
design research programs to accommodate these interests. The current regulatory regime, including recent
federal initiatives and proposed reforms, seems to emphasize three essential values: protecting vulnerable
research subjects, promoting access to new and much-needed therapies, and satisfying the “social need for
research to validate new needed therapies.”241 However, with the ebb and ﬂow of scientiﬁc and medical
advances, as well as the inevitable setbacks, history has demonstrated that policy shifts and regulatory
reforms must adapt to the changing times. For example, citing the “proliferation of new and deadly diseases,”
239Addicott, supra note 19, at 524.
240See id. at 524 (adding to the list of proposed regulatory reforms a requirement that IRBs that work with the terminally ill
have at least one member who is a representative of the terminally ill, a requirement that researchers who work with terminally
ill patients undergo psychological training, and a mandate providing that research generally should involve the terminally ill
only if it is intended to beneﬁt them).
241Brody, supra note 6, at 45.
52one commentator notes that “[r]esearch over the past decade has shifted in the public’s mind from an
enterprise in which subjects need protection to one in which subjects demand access.”242
Nevertheless, it seems clear from the constant back and forth wrangling over the potential beneﬁts and
risks of clinical research and access to experimental therapies that “there are [still] serious deﬁciencies in
the current system for the protection of the rights and interests of human subjects.”243 As depicted in
the preceding pages, the interplay between Congress, the courts, the medical and scientiﬁc communities, as
well as terminally ill patients themselves, has continued to play an essential role in the debates surrounding
clinical research involving human subjects. Perhaps only by maintaining a constant dialogue between these
key participants will terminally ill patients get the beneﬁts they deserve from clinical research, enjoying the
protections provided under the regulations while at the same time gaining access to potentially life-saving
new therapies – both goals, although seemingly irreconcilable at times, tailored to respect the dignity and
autonomy of those individuals who stand at the heart of the debate, battling their illnesses armed with
promising new weapons as well as appropriate shields of protection.
242Berg et al., supra note 188, at 273.
243Id. (citation omitted).
53Epilogue and Dedication
This paper is dedicated to a very dear friend of mine who is currently battling ovar-
ian cancer and who recently began a twelve-week Phase II clinical trial at a major medical
institution. When I ﬁrst began researching the topic for this paper, my friend had just en-
rolled in the trial and was ﬁlled with extreme hope that the experimental treatment would
be successful in beating the insidious disease. Sadly, painfully aware that her cancer was
not responding to the treatment, my friend dropped out of the trial after just six weeks
and returned once again to try more conventional chemotherapy treatments instead. As I
researched the federal regulations and policies governing clinical research involving termi-
nally ill patients, and as I explored the emotionally-charged and dire circumstances in which
many such individuals ﬁnd themselves, I remained constantly mindful of the experience of
my friend, as she continues to search for an eﬀective treatment to beat the disease – a ﬁnal
hope in her painful battle against cancer.
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